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I. INTRODUCTION
The "telecommunications revolution" has moved from cich6 to real-
ity. It is now transforming how people live and work. Telephone service is
now available through a computer terminal over the Internet, through
wireless handsets, and through good old-fashioned wireline telephones.
Service is now available from more providers than ever; competitive carri-
ers now challenge the long-distance, local, and even Internet incumbents
with aggressive pricing and innovative products. Thousands of new com-
petitive players have entered the communications arena, an industry that is
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now worth more than $298 billion annually in the United States alone.'
This revolution is worldwide, promising to bring the world closer together
through communications that are faster, cheaper, and more reliable.
As this revolution, fueled by amazingly rapid technological advances,
transforms individuals' lives, regulators must navigate a difficult course.
They must ensure that government rules do not fall behind the swiftly
changing currents of technology and the marketplace, lest regulation frus-
trate these advances that give consumers needed services at reasonable
prices.
Against this backdrop of revolutionary change and regulatory chal-
lenge, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC)S ,,2
has struggled with the regulation of rates, termed "access charges, as-
sessed by local telephone companies to long-distance carriers needing to
interconnect to local networks. All too often, the task has involved an
anachronistic regulatory regime that is being rapidly outdated by market-
place developments.
Eight years ago, the FCC began to discard its largely discredited rate
regulation scheme by adopting market-based reforms. It abandoned older
style, cost-plus rate-of-return regulation in favor of "price cap" regulation,
which focused on prices and created incentives for telephone companies to
innovate and become more efficient. Price caps are a system in which
regulators set a maximum cap on prices for a certain service, and the cap is
reduced each year by a set amount based on estimated improvements in ef-
ficiency. Local exchange carriers (LECs) support price cap regulation be-
cause it allows them to charge the cap price even if the actual cost of pro-
viding the service is substantially lower, thus potentially leading to higher
profits. Regulators like the price cap regime because it consistently re-
duces access charges. Despite eight years of tinkering, the FCC continues
to try to get these new price cap regulations "right," while controversy
rages among local telephone companies, long-distance carriers, customers,
and regulators concerning the scope and necessity of the FCC's regulatory
regime.
This Article analyzes the last eight years of experience under price
cap regulation and evaluates what has gone right and wrong. Although
price cap regulation has produced reduced rates to long-distance carriers
(though not necessarily to long-distance customers) and more efficient
1. The $298 billion figure is for 1996. NEw YoRK TIMES 1998 ALMANAc 787 (John
W. Wright ed., 1997).
2. "Access charges" are the fees that long-distance carriers pay to local telephone
companies for use of their networks to complete long-distance calls and comprise some
40% of long-distance carrier costs.
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pricing than under rate-of-return regulation, it has ultimately fallen victim
to incessant tampering and lagged far behind marketplace changes.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Commission's price cap
regulatory regime is that the FCC has not allowed price caps to function
free of tampering. The entire premise of the price cap regime is that by
placing a cap on prices, local carriers will have an incentive to improve ef-
ficiency beyond the levels mandated by the caps themselves because, un-
like under rate-of-return regulation, carriers can keep the profits. Although
motivated by public interest considerations, the FCC has undermined these
very advantages by reinserting vestiges of rate-of-return regulation into the
new system and permitting external political factors to impact its price cap
decisions. First, the Commission has repeatedly imposed retroactive ad-
justments to the price cap indices in order to correct underestimates. Sec-
ond, the Commission has repeatedly revised the productivity factor up-
wards and maintained a nonefficiency based add-on. Third, the calculation
formula for the X-Factor itself has been quite arbitrary, each time gener-
ating charges that the changes were politically motivated or result driven.
Using high earnings to justify a higher X-Factor is, in effect, back door
rate-of-return regulation, a result the FCC said it was trying to avoid. Fi-
nally, the FCC has never adopted a "pass through" requirement that would
mandate that long-distance carriers pass along price reductions generated
by price caps to consumers. Absent such a requirement, the Commission
has struggled to broker side deals with long-distance carriers that insure
consumers benefit from these reductions.
Each of these four departures from price cap principles has under-
mined the fundamental premise of the regulatory program-namely, to
permit price cap carriers to keep higher-than-expected productivity gains
as profit as an incentive to improve efficiency, while at the same time re-
ducing consumer prices. Instead, the Commission, as if it were still func-
tioning under a rate-of-return regime, has looked to the company's ulti-
mate rate of return, determined that the rate was too high, and then
adjusted the price caps to eliminate some of these gains, while struggling
to find ways to prompt consumer rate reductions. Although these changes
have all been well-intentioned, they have ultimately helped to sink the very
ship they were designed to save. If the ship is to be righted and the voyage
to full competition resumed, the Commission should return to its original
price cap principles by adopting a series of course corrections that will en-
able all parties to thrive.
Until the voyage to competition is complete, the Commission should
adopt the following reforms to ensure that the public realizes the full bene-
fits of price caps: (1) simplify and maintain X-Factor principles over the
long haul to create firm incentives for LECs to become more efficient; (2)
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refrain from political tinkering with X-Factor or retroactive adjustments in
the cap that deny LECs the benefit of their bargain by using a moving his-
torical average to compute X-Factor charges; (3) eliminate the consumer
product dividend so that the cap reflects actual achievable efficiency gains;
(4) adopt an explicit pass-through requirement that will require long-
distance carriers to pass through price cap reductions to consumers; (5)
provide pricing flexibility to allow the caps to function more like free mar-
kets; and (6) permit new services to be offered outside the caps to encour-
age innovation and recognize the markets that now exist for these services.
Only when a consistent and predictable price cap system is in place
will the goals of creating market-based incentives for improved efficiency
be achieved and the process depoliticized. As set forth below, such a price
cap course is consistent with the initial stated goals of price cap regulation
and best positions the Commission for the eventual transition to a free
competitive market for these services.
This Article lays out the case for these reforms based on the initial
price cap theory and the evolving state of the telecommunications market-
place. Part II presents different models of regulating local exchange carri-
ers, describing the difficulties with the old rate-of-return system and the
theoretical advantages of a price cap regime. Part Ill explains how the
FCC's creation of a price cap plan in 1990 contained modifications to ad-
dress the perceived shortcomings of a pure price cap system. Part IV de-
scribes the many subsequent modifications the FCC made to its original
1990 plan. Part V details the experiences of various states with price cap
systems, including the progressive reforms by states like California that
have been responsive to market and regulatory developments. Finally, Part
VI evaluates the current price cap system, discussing both its advantages
and shortcomings and sets forth recommendations designed to allow price
caps to achieve their full regulatory potential.
II. HISTORY OF LOCAL EXCHANGE CARRIER REGULATION
To furnish long-distance telephone service, providers such as AT&T
need to connect to local networks that are owned and operated by LECs,
such as US West.3 Before the advent of the modern telecommunications
revolution, it was widely believed that telephone service was a natural mo-
nopoly, especially local telephone service, which required a connection to
each individual customer's residence or business.
3. The Author sometimes refers to long-distance carriers by their more technical name
"interexchange carriers" or "IXCs," reflecting that such carriers must transfer a call over
both local and long-distance networks in order to connect a long-distance call.
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Initially, because AT&T had a monopoly in the provision of both lo-
cal and long-distance services, the FCC relied upon informal negotiated
rate making it termed "continued surveillance." In the 1960s, with the ad-
vent of some competition in the local market, the FCC turned to rate-of-
return regulation, a widely used means of regulating industries with lim-
ited competition, in order to control the amount that could be charged by
LECs for allowing a long-distance call to go over the long-distance net-
work. More recently, as the idea that telephony is a natural monopoly has
been discarded in the face of technological advances, regulators have con-
sidered alternative means of regulating rates charged by LECs to IXCs for
interconnecting long-distance calls with the local networks. Two of the
more prominent and more promising means of regulation are Social Com-
pacts and Price Caps. This section describes the FCC's historical approach
to access charges.
A. The Agency's Early Efforts to Regulate the Telephone Industry
Focused on the Rate-of-Return Model
1. The Commission Attempted to Regulate Effectively AT&T's
Monopoly in Long-Distance and Local Telephone Services
Before the mid-1960s, regulation of the telephone industry was rela-
tively straightforward. AT&T was the sole provider of interexchange
services, and thus the only company that the FCC had to regulate. It was
widely believed that the provision of telephone services constituted a natu-
ral monopoly,4 "an industry ... where the entire market demand can be
met at [the] least cost by a single firm," 5 because, among other things, the
cost of entering the market and of laying new telephone lines was consid-
ered prohibitively expensive. Congress itself readily accepted the belief
that substantial technological barriers to entry in the telephone industry
rendered the Bell System a natural monopoly.
6
4. There have been disputes between economists as to whether the structure of the
telecommunications industry was indeed a natural monopoly. See, e.g., MORTON I.
HAMBURG & STUART N. BROTMAN, CoMMuNICATIONS LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.04[5], at 1-
25 (Law Journals Seminars-Press 1995); Howard Griboff, Comment, New Freedom for
AT&T in the Competitive Long Distance Market, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 435, 438-39 n.9
(1992) ("In the case of the phone system, regulatory, economic, and technological barriers
to competitive entry helped AT&T maintain its market dominance and 'monopoly'
status.").
5. WALTER G. BOLTER Er AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY FOR THE 1980s: THE
TRANSITION TO COMPETrrION 31 (Prentice Hall, Inc. 1984).
6. See Dean Burch, Common Carrier Communications by Wire and Radio: A Retro-
spective, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 85, 88 (1985).
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Given this widely held view that the telephone industry was a natural
monopoly, the FCC's regulatory policy in this era aimed at increasing effi-
ciency, limiting consumer costs, and ensuring universal access to tele-
phone services. The FCC did not give any thought to increasing competi-
tion. As one commentator observed of the FCC's approach:
Where such conditions prevail, competitive entry, at least in theory,
will prove short-lived, thereby wasting scarce resources. However, to
prevent an unreasonable rise in prices and reduction in quality of
service, as is customary with unregulated monopolies, the FCC main-
tained "continued surveillance" of the rates charged and the services
provided through a tariffing mechanism.
7
In developing a telecommunications regulatory model, the FCC
looked to other agencies responsible for regulating industries that were
deemed natural monopolies, such as the electric utilities.8 Accordingly, the
Commission used rate-of-return-rate base regulation, the same tool histori-
cally used to regulate other public utilities.9
Initially, the rate-setting process between the FCC and AT&T was
relatively informal. From 1934 to 1965, under a program labeled
"continued surveillance," the FCC and AT&T essentially engaged in an
informal process of rate making.10 As one scholar described the situation:
In effect, continuing surveillance consisted of private negotiations
between AT&T and the FCC concerning the level of interstate rates
and aggregate revenue[s] . . . . During the early 1960s, the FCC,
through the continuing surveillance process, set an informal limit for
the return on AT&T's investment at approximately 8%. When
AT&T's rate of return approached this percentage, the FCC and
AT&T would initiate negotiations that were often followed by reduc-
tions in interstate rates.
By the mid-1960s, however, the telecommunications industry began
to change. Emerging technologies such as computers, microchips, and mi-
crowave transmission began to create for the first time a real possibility for
the formation of a truly competitive telecommunications market. The tra-
ditional belief that the telephone sector was a natural monopoly began to
seem doubtful in light of technological advances such as microwave tech-
nology. Given this new potential, regulators began to wonder if a monopo-
listic interexchange system was the best means of providing uniform and
7. Sutapa Ghosh, The Future of FCC Dominant Carrier Rate Regulation: The Price
Caps Scheme, 41 FED. COMM. L.J. 401, 403 (1989) (citations omitted).
8. Like the telephone company, the electric companies provided service through a
wire connection to each customer.
9. BOLTER, supra note 5, at 31.
10. Id. at27.
11. Id. (citation omitted).
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universal service.12 Moreover, the FCC realized that negotiated informal
rate making was no longer the best means of regulating a market that
could, in some aspects, be competitive.
Despite the promise of new technology, the FCC feared that AT&T's
vast resources and dominance would preclude the entry of competitors. 3
Indeed, only small parts of AT&T's monopoly were believed to bein areas
where competition was viewed as possible in the near future. The main
such area was the long-distance market. Consequently, in 1967, the agency
instituted a series of new regulations designed to prevent AT&T from
cross-subsidizing competitive services with monopoly revenue to gain an
unfair competitive advantage. 14 These new regulations served as the
agency's formal implementation of the rate-of-return regulatory strategy.'5
Rate-base regulation, commonly referred to as rate-of-return regula-
tion (ROR), was a ratemaking instrument of public utility commissions. Its
purpose was to protect the consumer from excessive costs, while ensuring
that investors received a fair return on their investments. As one commen-
tator described the system:
Regulators replace the market as the enforcer of economic efficiency
by establishing the cost structure considered most representative of
costs in a competitive market. Establishing prices involves negotiation
between the regulated company and the regulators, with the final fig-
ure usually being a compromise between a competitive market and
monopoly pricing.
Once the cost structure has been established, the regulators must en-
sure the economic viability of the essential service provider by adding
a pre-set rate of return on invested capital.16
Accordingly, public utility commissions and carriers were expected
to work together to determine the rates that regulated companies would
charge to American consumers. To pass constitutional muster, the deter-
mined rates had to be (1) "just and reasonable" and (2) balance the inter-
ests of the investor and the consumer,17 but these broad standards allowed
12. Ghosh, supra note 7, at 404.
13. Id. at 402.
14. Id. (the main objective being "to deter AT&T from shifting revenue from services
on which it held market dominance to emerging services on which it faced competition").
15. Patricia Margiotta, The Local Exchange Carrier Price Cap Order, 63 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 723, 724 (1995).
16. Robert B. Friedrich, Note, Regulatory and Antitrust Implications of Emerging
Competition in Local Access Telecommunications: How Congress and the FCC Can En-
courage Competition and Technological Progress in Telecommunications, 80 CORNELL L.
REv. 646, 689-90 (1995) (citation omitted).
17. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
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the regulatory commissions considerable flexibility to work with busi-
nesses to reach a desired rate of return. I
Designed to foster competition in some market segments and to sus-
tain sufficient monopoly revenues in others, rate-of-return regulation in-
volved a complex series of calculations that carefully examined a tele-
communications carrier's revenue and expense structure to determine an
"optimal" rate of return. Each LEC was required to provide a detailed cost-
of-service analysis covering the previous twelve months. 19 These analyses
attempted to determine the total cost of the expenditures necessary to pro-
vide phone service. This information would help inform the FCC of the
actual cost of providing telephone service. After ascertaining this amount,
the agency limited the service provider in question to a specified percent-
age return on its investment. To increase rates above the authorized level,
carriers had to file additional documentation justifying the need for in-
creased rates. Such documentation included "a projection-of-costs study,
complete explanations for the studies and data, and any other relevant cost
or marketing data." 0
Under this framework, the "correct" rate of return promised to pro-
vide consumers with expanded telephone services at reasonable rates. Ad-
ditionally, the rate would also satisfy the service providers by allowing
them to cover their costs and achieve a reasonable return on their invest-
ment.
2. Rate-of-Return Regulation Is Inherently Inefficient in Mature
Competitive Markets
In the beginning of telecommunications regulation, the benefits of a
rate-of-return policy outweighed any apparent disadvantages. Aided by de-
clining costs, telephone service increased exponentially, and carriers re-
ceived a healthy return on their investments.
Nevertheless, problems developed. The cost-plus strategy implicit in
rate-of-return regulation, combined with difficulties of administration,
eventually undermined the system's benefits. Carriers had little incentive
18. As one commentator noted,
the process of setting a "fair" rate of return is a difficult one. If set too low, in-
vestors could be deterred and the regulation could constitute an unconstitutional
confiscation of earned revenue. On the other hand, if set too high, consumers
would pay inflated prices that would not reflect the quality of the services pro-
vided.
Ghosh, supra note 7, at 406 (citations omitted).
19. HAMBURG & BROTMAN, supra note 4, § 4.04[l], at 4-39. See also 47 C.F.R. §
61.38(b) (1998).
20. HAMBURG & BROTMAN, supra note 4, § 4.04[1], at 4-39 (citations omitted).
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to invest in a way that increased efficiency, and regulators feared that car-
riers were padding their books with the assurance of full recovery plus
profit. Moreover, the birth of the competitive marketplace ushered in the
demise of a rate-of-return approach.
a. Rate of Return-Essentially a "Cost-Plus" Contract
A rate-of-return regulatory strategy is analogous to a cost-plus con-
tract, with all its attendant shortcomings.21 "A cost-plus contract usually
begins with an estimate of actual production costs, but the estimate is not
binding. Rather, the buyer agrees to reimburse all costs actually incurred
by the seller, and to add an appropriate profit margin."22 The FCC itself
observed these parallels between rate of return and cost-plus contracts,
stating that "rate-of-return regulation is analogous to a cost-plus contract,
since all costs that can reasonably be represented as necessary to produc-
tion generally become part of the firm's revenue requirement and are col-
lected from ratepayers." Thus, unlike in a normal market, little incentive
exists to reduce production costs.
As public utilities under the rate-of-return system, the amount of
money that LECs spent delivering services was divided into two catego-
ries: costs and investment.24 Traditionally, public utilities were allowed to
set rates up to an amount that recovered costs on a dollar-for-dollar basis,
plus a reasonable rate of return on the amount invested. The simplified ba-
sic formula is thus Rate = C + I(R), where C is costs, I is investment, and
R is the rate of return.25
Assigning numbers to this formula shows why, under a rate-of-return
system, the utility may have a disincentive to become more efficient.
Imagine that company A supplies telecommunications services and has in-
vested $100 in infrastructure overall to do so. In addition to its investment,
the company spends $100 a year on costs, such as salaries for its employ-
ees. Here, if the set rate of return was 10 percent, the utility would be able
to charge up to $110 when it first offers its service: $100 to recover actual
26
costs (salaries) and $10 as a 10 percent return on its $100 investment.
21. Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers (Part One of Two),
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 3 F.C.C.R. 3195, para. 43 (1988) [hereinafter
Dominant Carriers FNPRM].
22. Id. para. 42.
23. Id. para. 43.
24. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
25. Id.
26. Since investment is net of depreciation, these figures change during subsequent
years. The annual depreciation expense is added to costs. For simplicity, these effects are
ignored in this example.
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If company A became more efficient by reducing salaries, it would
not benefit at all. The savings would be passed directly on to the consum-
ers, as the company is only allowed to charge for actual expenses. So in
this example, if company A's costs dropped from $100 to $80, the maxi-
mum allowable rate would drop to $90. An increase in costs would also be
passed directly through to consumers, so if company A's staffing costs
grew to $150, the company could charge $160. This meant that the utility
faced neither positive pressure to decrease costs nor negative pressure
against cost increases.
The utility may also seek to become more efficient by decreasing the
level of investment necessary to provide the same amount of service.
Digital switches, for example, are much less maintenance intensive than
electro-mechanical units, and their installation may thus reduce the overall
amount that company A has to spend on infrastructure. Under rate of re-
turn, the gains of that efficiency increase would have to be passed on to
consumers as well. 27 In this example, a 10 percent reduction in the amount
spent on infrastructure would reduce the company's overall investment to
$90, but because the company is allowed to make at most a 10 percent re-
turn on investment, the utility would have to lower its prices to $109, or
$100 in costs plus a 10 percent rate of return of $9. Thus, the utility's total
profit can actually decrease the more efficient the company becomes.28
That the utility can earn more overall profits by increasing its in-
vestment also may lead to what some have called "gold plating." This is
the alleged practice of using higher quality or capacity infrastructure than
is necessary to provide the required service to increase the utility's amount
of investment and thus its total profits. 29 A telecommunications firm, for
example, might use expensive, large capacity switches in an area where
lower capacity, lower cost switches or remote nodes would perform just as
well. While the rate of return that the company can earn does not change,
the company will be earning that rate on a larger amount of invested dol-
lars and thus have higher total profits. Regardless of the prevalence of gold
plating, the risk of such behavior pointed out the perverse incentives cre-
ated by a rate-of-return system. In addition, oversight to prevent such po-
tentialities was complex and expensive, imposing a large burden on both
27. See Ghosh, supra note 7, at 411.
28. Of course, a utility's incentive to reduce investment costs will be heavily dependent
on the return it could earn in alternative investments. Thus, if the return set under ROR
were too high, the incentive to "gold plate," or to install higher quality or capacity infra-
structure than needed, would increase. At the same time, if the return set under ROR were
too low, there would be little incentive to gold plate because the utility could earn a greater
return on alternative investments.
29. See supra note 28.
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the companies and the government, and the system still failed to provide
positive incentives for utilities to reduce costs.3
b. High Levels of Administrative Involvement and Oversight
In addition to distorting natural economic incentives, rate-of-return
regulation also created administrative difficulties. The actual process of
calculating the appropriate rate of return detracted from the successful im-
plementation of the policy. The divestiture of AT&T, combined with the
rise of close to 1300 access providers, made the rate-of-return regulatory
scheme cumbersome and difficult to administer. As the agency explained,
When rate of return was applied by the Commission to interstate tele-
phone operations in the 1960s, the regulatory environment in which it
was introduced was vastly different from today. In 1965, rate of return
needed to be applied only to one telephone services provider-AT&T.
... Today, we operate in a much more complex environment.... For
the first time, the Commission had to app}ly its rate of return mecha-
nisms directly to 1400 providers of access.
In this complex environment, effective cost-of-service analysis-to
say nothing of extensive monitoring for gold-plating and cost-padding-
was a difficult and time-consuming task. The Commission soon realized
that the administrative maintenance of such a system exacted high costs
and potentially harmed the market for telephone services. Although the
agency performed such tasks, the costs both to the agency and to the public
were high. The FCC ultimately concluded that its experience revealed that,
while "rate of return oversight is a responsible, functional method of cor-
recting for these [unsavory] tendencies ... , a regulatory system that sim-
ply corrects for a tendency to pad investments or expenses is not a system
that can also drive LECs to become more efficient and productive."
32
The mounting concerns about rate-of-return regulation were becom-
ing more acute with the rapid changes occurring throughout the national
and international telecommunications markets. The Commission stated
that it was "concerned that, particularly for the largest LECs, the system of
regulation [it] currently employ[s] does not serve to sharpen the competi-
tiveness of this important segment of the industry at a time when markets
for telecommunications goods and services are becoming increasingly
competitive, both nationally and internationally., 33 Facing significant
30. Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, Second Report and Or-
der, 5 F.C.C.R. 6786, para. 25, 68 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 226 (1990) [hereinafter Dominant
Carriers Second Report and Order].
31. Id. paras. 26-27 (citation omitted).
32. Id. paras. 29-30 (citation omitted).
33. Id. para. 28.
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technological advances and potential international competition, the FCC
was forced to reexamine the effectiveness and necessity of rate-of-return
regulation in light of new competitive marketplace pressures.
3. The Agency Abolished the Rate-of-Return System
The growing concern that rate-of-return regulation was ill suited to
the new telecommunications marketplace eventually led the FCC to elimi-
nate its rate-of-return system for the largest carriers. 34 Under examination,
the persistent failure of rate-of-return to replicate the competitive market
became apparent. Although some had suggested improvements to the
rate-of-return system to increase market competitiveness, the FCC ulti-
mately concluded that "rate of return does not provide sufficient incentives
for broad innovations in the way firms do business. 35 Many feared these
adverse incentives would hinder the arrival of a competitive market.
Consequently, in the late 1980s, the Commission began to search for
an alternative regulatory strategy that could incorporate and mimic the in-
centives found in a competitive market. As the agency commented,
"[i]ncentive regulation, by creating incentives for carriers to become more
productive, generates powerful motives to innovate, and is a better way of
regulating."
36
B. The FCC Rejected the Social Compact Model
One possible alternative, used by several states, was the so-called
"social compact" system. A social compact is an agreement between a car-
rier and a regulatory agency about efficiency gains and carrier profits. As
two commentators explained:
The social contract postulates a quid pro quo by which ratepayers are
assured that efficiency will be imputed in their rates and telephone
companies are assured that the rates for monopoly services will in-
crease at the rate of inflation, less a factor representing that efficiency
gain. This approach could lead to deregulation which would
take place through an agreement between state authorities and
individual telephone companies. The companies would be re-
quired to limit local rate increases according to some external
index, such as the Consumer Price Index, and to make specified
capital investments during the contract period to maintain and
upgrade their networks. In return, the companies would be freed
from the burdens of rate-of-return regulation for all services and
34. Other carriers, predominantly smaller rural providers, continue to be regulated un-
der a rate-of-return system.
35. Dominant Carriers Second Report and Order, supra note 30, para. 32.
36. Id.
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would be subject to minimal regulation, at most, of particular
services.
37
Given the initial success that several states appeared to have with the
social compact approach,"' the FCC considered it as a replacement for rate-
of-return regulation for the entire nation. Under a national social compact,
the Commission would freeze telephone rates for interstate services.
"Increases thereafter would be limited by a certain formula (such as in-
creases in the consumer price index). In return, all other telephone com-
pany services would be deregulated or detariffed."'3 9
Ultimately, however, the FCC decided against the social compact
system. Although consumers initially would benefit from a price freeze,
the agency had doubts about the policy's long-term effectiveness." The
FCC was especially dubious of the program's ability to improve innova-
tion and efficiency incentives throughout the industry.4' As the Commis-
sion concluded, "[alithough freezing rates would stabilize rates, over time
such action would cause rates to depart from underlying costs in an unpre-
dictable manner. This would promote neither consumers' nor carriers' in-
terests. 42
Social compacts also came under heavy criticism from commentators
and other industry observers. One fear was that the telephone companies
might possibly evade pricing limits by degrading service quality while
holding prices flat.43 Another concern was that if the cost of providing
service dramatically declined, telephone companies might reap excessive
profits.44 Furthermore, the deficiencies of rate of return could resurface be-
cause freezing prices for only one customer class might stimulate cross-
subsidization with its resulting inefficiencies. 45 Based on these different
37. Gail Garfield Schwartz & Jeffrey H. Hoagg, Virtual Divestiture: Structural Reform
of an RHC, 44 FED. COMm. L.J. 285, 317 n.79 (1991) (citation omitted).
38. See, e.g., Dominant Carriers Second Report and Order, supra note 30. "The Ver-
mont commission and New England Telephone (NET) have agreed upon a Negotiated So-
cial Contract, effective 1988-92. Under this contract, NET's local service rates are frozen;
its toll, WATS, and Centrex rates are capped." Id. para. 43.
39. National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Comprehensive
Review of Rate of Return Regulation of the U.S. Telecommunications Industry, Notice;
Request for Comments, 51 Fed. Reg. 36,837, at 36,839 (1986) [hereinafter Rate-of-Return
Regulation Notice].
40. Dominant Carriers FNPRM, supra note 21, paras. 70-81.
41. Id.
42. Id. para. 15.
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policy concerns, the FCC rejected social compacts as a replacement for
rate-of-return regulation.
C. The Commission Believed Price Cap Regulation Best Balanced
the New Regulatory Demands
With the social compact alternative discredited, the FCC next exam-
ined the potential for a price cap approach to rate regulation. A number of
states, as well as foreign countries such as Great Britain, had experimented
with price caps with considerable success.46 Unlike a rate-of-return scheme
that regulates the amount of profit a company can earn, a pure price cap
scheme focuses directly on regulating the end price that the utility charges
its customers. This shift in emphasis from profit to price provides a num-
ber of theoretical advantages: (1) it is easier and less costly to administer;
(2) it is much better at promoting efficiency on the part of the utility; (3) it
allows for a smoother and less disruptive transition between monopoly and
competitive service provision; and (4) it reduces access charges, which in
theory should reduce consumers' long-distance costs.
1. The FCC Saw Price Caps as Easier and Less Costly to Oversee
than Rate-of-Return Based Systems
A rate-of-return system focuses on the maximum allowable percent-
age return that providers can make on their total level of investment. 47 As a
result, the regulatory agency must establish elaborate proceedings to verify
the total amount that the utility has invested in providing service, whether
this investment is reasonable, and the amount that the company is actually
earning expressed as a percentage of that investment. The process is ex-
pensive and time consuming, both for the utility and the regulatory agency.
In contrast, price cap regimes have the potential to be much easier to
implement. In the most basic price cap system, the governing body simply
sets the maximum price that the provider can charge for its services. Since
the focus is on the end price charged to the consumer rather than the
amount that the provider invests in delivering its service, whether the util-
ity is complying is readily apparent. The agency need only look at the
price that the provider is charging, thus reducing or eliminating the need
for unwieldy cost-of-service hearings.48
Of course, the price cap system implemented by the FCC in 1990 for
the largest LECs was much more complicated than a simple "X price and
46. See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 2 F.C.C.R. 5208, paras. 25-32 (1987).
47. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
48. See Ghosh, supra note 7, at 421.
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no higher" regime.49 Many of the details of the FCC plan required close
monitoring. But even with the added nuances required by the complex na-
ture of the telecommunications industry, the focus on price, which itself is
generally easily observable, made price cap systems easier to administer
than a rate-of-return regime.5
2. The Commission Planned to Promote Efficiency and
Technological Development by Allowing LECs to Reap the
Benefits of Change
In another contrast to a rate-of-return regime, a pure price cap system
allows the company to keep the extra profit generated by efficiency in-
creases in either infrastructure or expenses."' Under a price cap system, the
regulatory body focuses on setting the maximum price that the utility can
charge for its services, rather than specifying the amount of money that the
utility's shareholders can earn on their investment. This means that the
regulatory agency commits not to intercede and force the utility to return
profits that it earns in excess of the prescribed rate of return, which in turn
gives the company the incentive to maximize efficiency.
52
For example, assume that company B's total cost outlay to provide
telecommunications services is $110. Under a rate-of-return regime, the
agency would have to determine which costs were investment and which
were expenses, and it would only allow the company to recover the speci-
fied rate on the amount of investment.53 A reduction in expenses would
lead to no gain in profits, as these costs are recovered on a 1:1 basis, while
a reduction in investment might actually lead to lower overall profits.
If company B is operating under a pure price cap regime, however,
the situation is much different. If the price per unit is set at $115 under
price caps and the overall cost per unit to company B is $110, then the
49. The specific details of the plan adopted by the FCC are discussed in Part III infra.
50. Dominant Carriers Second Report and Order, supra note 30, paras. 34-37.
51. Compare supra Part I.A.2.
52. In a "pure" price cap system, the utility would be allowed to retain the entire
amount it gained through increases in efficiency. The FCC's ultimate system was far from
pure, as discussed infra. As discussed below, the FCC initially adopted a hybrid price cap
scheme that required the LECs to pass some of their revenue from efficiency gains on to the
consumer. This "sharing doctrine" has since been eliminated by the Commission. See infra
Parts II and IV; Dominant Carriers Second Report and Order, supra note 30; Price Cap
Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers, Fourth Report and Order in CC Docket
No. 94-1 and Second Report and Order in CC Docket No. 96-262, 12 F.C.C.R. 16,642, 8
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 119 (1997) [hereinafter Price Cap Fourth Report and Order]; see also
James M. Fink, The Battle over the Rewrite of Illinois' Telecommunications Law: Is More
Reform Needed?, 11 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 189, 210 (1991).
53. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
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company starts by making a $5 per unit profit. If the company can become
more efficient and reduce costs by 10 percent (dropping the cost per unit to
$99), its profit increases by more than 200 percent, to $16 per unit. Under
a pure price cap system, the regulatory body does not lower the maximum
rates that utilities can charge when there is a drop in production costs. 4 As
this simplified example shows, even a modest gain in overall production
efficiency can lead to a tremendous increase in profitability, which pro-
vides a powerful stimulus for LECs to find cheaper, more effective ways to
provide service. Moreover, since the price cap model does not distinguish
between expenses and investment, the LEC can explore reductions in ei-
ther of these areas to produce efficiency gains.
Price caps thus address the alleged problems of gold-plating or cost-
padding of the traditional rate-of-return regime. By specifying the maxi-
mum amount that the provider can charge for a service, the price cap sys-
tem removes the incentive to install costly and unnecessary infrastructure.
If company B can only charge $115 per unit for its services, it is unlikely
to build a system that increases its costs to $114, when a system that costs
$110 would do just as well. In fact, the price cap system puts just the op-
posite pressure on a telecommunications provider, producing positive in-
centives to reduce costs.
The price cap system is so effective in eliminating the urge for un-
necessary investment that some worried that it would go too far and lead to
a reduction in service quality."' To the extent that competition exists in the
marketplace, this criticism is less important. Competition from other firms,
which are looking for a competitive advantage, will provide a counter-
vailing pressure on the utility to provide the highest quality service for
which its consumers will pay. However, in markets where competition has
yet to develop, the potential problems of service degradation can be ad-
dressed using regulatory quality-of-service reviews.
5 6
3. The FCC Viewed Price Caps as a Transitional Regulatory
Mechanism Between Monopoly and Competition
Price caps more closely mimic a competitive market than the old
rate-of-return scheme. Under rate-of-return regulation, the FCC estab-
lished prices based on the LEC's costs plus a reasonable return on invest-
ment. Consequently, the FCC could only indirectly modify the prices that
54. Ghosh, supra note 7, at 408-09. This example refers to a pure price cap model that
does not contain anything like the FCC's sharing formula or the X-Factor discussed infra.
55. See, e.g., Margiotta, supra note 15, at 727-28 n.47.
56. See, e.g., Dominant Carriers Second Report and Order, supra note 30, paras. 332-
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consumers pay by (1) changing the percentage rate-of-return on investment
that the utilities may recover or (2) challenging the LEC's costs. With
price caps, however, the agency has more flexibility to set the price of
service directly, and thus it has a better opportunity to set prices at a level
that mirrors what they would be in a competitive environment. Further-
more, the efficiency improvements that the utilities will create under price
caps means that the overall price of services can be lowered without im-
• 57
posing confiscatory regulations.
Since price caps more closely simulate the conditions of a competi-
tive market, they allow for a transition from a regulated to a deregulated
industry. A transitional step between the old regime and a competitive
marketplace allows the consumer to receive the benefits of a competitive
marketplace, such as increased efficiency and greater technological inno-
58
vation, without having to wait for real competition to develop.
Moreover, the use of an incentive-based regulatory system like price
caps increases the flexibility that a company has to respond to changing
market conditions.59 Under a rate-of-return regime, a utility must file a tar-
iff with the regulatory body to alter prices; the subsequent tariff investiga-
tion requires the company to prove that the rate increase is justified. These
investigations can be time consuming and expensive and often require the
production of extremely detailed cost support data. As nonregulated com-
petitors that do not have the same obligations enter the market, this com-
plex and exhaustive process will put the regulated company at a significant
disadvantage, since it will be unable to respond quickly to its competitors'
actions.60
In a price cap regime, however, the utilities have a measure of pricing
flexibility. This allows them to adjust their prices within a specified range
in response to shifts in market conditions, such as the entry of a new com-
petitor.6 ' For example, if an unregulated competitor entered the market and
tried to "cherry pick" (i.e., take the best and most lucrative customers), a
utility that operated under traditional rate-of-return regulation could do lit-
tle to prevent the practice. On the other hand, a utility with pricing flexi-
bility might be able to react quickly enough in changing its own prices to
stave off such an attack. Eventually, once competition becomes estab-
57. Id. paras. 100-02.
58. See infra Part VI.
59. See infra Part VI.
60. See infra Part VI.
61. See infra Part VI.
62. Of course, the proper degree of pricing flexibility that the LECs require in order to
meet competitive challenges is a subject of debate. For further discussion of this point, see
infra Part III.
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lished in the marketplace, government regulation in general can be reduced
or eliminated; the free market will produce efficient prices and high qual-
ity service.63
4. The Commission Believed that Consumers Would Benefit from
the Reductions in Access Rates Caused by the Productivity
Factor
The final motivation behind adopting price caps came from the long-
distance market. As the price cap is reduced because of productivity and
other gains, the maximum access charge that LECs may assess for inter-
connecting long-distance calls will also be reduced commensurately. 64 In a
noncompetitive market, the long-distance carrier that pays this access
charge to the LEC might not pass along its savings to its customers, lead-
ing to a yearly windfall for that company equal to the size of the produc-
tivity factor. A truly competitive long-distance market should mitigate this
concern. In theory, with any input cost in a competitive market, a lower
access fee would likely be passed on to the long-distance consumer as dif-
ferent providers maneuver for pricing advantages. In practice, the long-
distance market may not act as competitively as the Commission would
like. Therefore, in order to ensure consumers benefit from price cap re-
ductions, the price cap scheme should have contained a cost savings pass-
through that requires long-distance providers to lower rates commensurate
with any reduction in access charges. As a result, the long-distance con-
sumer would stand to gain immediately from all access rate drops.
III. THE FCC's INITIAL VOYAGE WITH A PRICE CAP REGIME
After much debate and a number of proceedings, the FCC adopted a
price cap system to regulate the eight largest LECs in 1990.6 This was not,
however, a pure price cap system. Although the Commission wished to
63. See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Essay, Deregulation and Managed
Competition in Network Industries, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 117 (1998).
64. James E. Norris, Price Caps: An Alternative Regulatory Framework for Telecom-
munications Carriers, PuB. UTn. FORT., Jan. 18, 1990, at 44.
65. As noted below, one of the criticisms of price caps has been that long-distance pro-
viders such as AT&T have failed to pass on the savings from price caps to consumers. See,
e.g., COMM. DAIy, June 26, 1995, at 5 ("AT&T raised eye brows with [its] letter to [the]
FCC ... that said savings as [a] result of lower LEC access charges aren't enough to trigger
[a] reduction in AT&T's basic rates to [the] public.").
66. A price cap system was not imposed on the smaller LECs, though they could opt to
enter a price cap system if they wished. The FCC limited the plan to the larger LECs be-
cause its collected data for the productivity offset applied to the larger carriers, and it feared
that the mid-sized carriers could not generate productivity gains of the same magnitude. See
Dominant Carriers Second Report and Order, supra note 30, paras. 1-4.
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achieve the policy goals previously described, it also feared the potential
instability of a system previously untested on such a broad scale. As a re-
suit, the agency imposed significant restrictions on LECs, which the FCC
admitted might not fully produce the efficiency incentive of a pure price
cap regime.
The Commission adopted a formula to be applied annually for cal-
culating price caps. The basic formula is New Price Cap = Last Year's
Price Cap + Inflation +/- Exogenous Costs - Productivity Adjustent.67
Inflation is measured by the Gross National Product Price Index,' 8 and this
section discusses each of the other components of the formula in detail. In
addition to the basic formula, the FCC also instituted policies that would
retrospectively keep the LEC returns within certain limits, in effect im-
posing both a profit ceiling and a profit floor. These policies are also dis-
cussed in detail below.
A. The Initial Productivity Factor Was Set at a Level that Reflected
the LEC Industry's Historical Productivity
A key component of the price cap formula was a "productivity fac-
tor," also known as an "X-Factor" or a "productivity adjustment." The
factor is meant to reflect that the telecommunications industry as a whole
was becoming more efficient faster than the rest of the economy.69 The
productivity factor attempted to quantify this difference in efficiency im-
provements for the price cap formula and pass the benefits on to ratepay-
70
ers.
The productivity factor had to be chosen carefully, however, to en-
sure it accurately reflected gains in efficiency that the LECs were likely to
achieve. On the one hand, a productivity factor set too low would not pass
71
efficiency gains through to consumers. The LECs would essentially re-
ceive a windfall due to efficiency gains that outpaced the caps. If the pro-
67. Theodore D. Frank & Mitchell Lazarus, Developments in the Local Exchange Mar-
ketplace-1995, in 13TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS: POLICY AND
REGULATION 7, 30 (Pract. L. Inst. 1995). For an example of the full technical formula, see
Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers, First Report and Order, 10
F.C.C.R. 8961, app. B, 77 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 783 (1995) [hereinafter Price Cap First
Report and Order].
68. Dominant Carriers Second Report and Order, supra note 30, para. 50.
69. Id. para. 75.
70. Id. paras. 75-76. The FCC set the X-Factor based only on the efficiency gains that
exceeded those of the economy as a whole since the efficiency gains of the economy as a
whole were already reflected in the inflation factor separately accounted for in the price cap
formula. Id. para. 75.
71. Id. paras. 224-26.
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ductivity factor were set too high, LECs would be denied a reasonable re-
turn.
The FCC sought to find a balance between these poles. The inclusion
of a properly calibrated productivity factor required LECs to improve effi-
ciency to retain their profit levels, but permitted a LEC to retain the bene-
fits of efficiency gains above and beyond the industry norm. As the Com-
mission later said, "LECs must become more efficient, and offer
innovative, high quality services, in order to succeed under a price cap re-
gime. If a LEC falls to keep pace with the productivity requirement em-
bedded in the cap, it risks seeing its earnings erode.
'72
On the other hand, an overly optimistic productivity factor, which
planned for efficiency gains that the LECs in fact could not achieve, would
put tremendous pressure on the LECs to engage in the false economy of
reducing costs by downgrading investment.73 One benefit of rate-of-return
regulation was that its "cost plus" nature made it easy and risk free for
LECs to provide high-quality, broad-based service. Imposing an unrea-
sonably high productivity factor could mean that the LECs could sacrifice
service quality to preserve profits.
Thus, for the price cap system to work, the Commission needed to set
a productivity factor that would realistically reflect how much a LEC could
improve efficiency within the next year. This would necessarily be a pre-
diction and a somewhat uncertain one at that. However, the accuracy of the
productivity factor was the key ingredient in price cap regulation and dic-
tated the economic signals that would be sent to carriers for the coming
year.
The agency knew that LECs tended to increase their productivity
faster than the economy as a whole,74 but the exact amount of the increase
would vary from year to year. To overcome this difficulty, the FCC in its
initial price cap scheme tried to estimate the historical degree to which
LEC productivity had surpassed that of the general economy.75
Originally, the FCC conducted two studies and concluded that LEC
productivity growth on average had exceeded that of the economy as a
72. Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, Order on Reconsidera-
tion, 6 F.C.C.R. 2637, para. 3, 69 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1 (1991) [hereinafter Dominant
Carriers Order on Reconsideration].
73. Dominant Carriers Second Report and Order, supra note 30, para. 101.
74. Dominant Carriers FNPRM, supra note 21, para. 378.
75. See generally Dominant Carriers Order on Reconsideration, supra note 72, paras.
22-32. "This [initial productivity] factor was based largely upon two staff studies investi-
gating the extent to which LECs have historically exceeded the economy as a whole in
achieving improved productivity." Id. para. 22.
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76
whole by 2.8 percent a year. It accordingly set the productivity offset at77 ..
that level. Because this figure was recognized as uncertain and swings in
LEC profits or losses were thought undesirable, the FCC gave carriers the
option of choosing a second, higher X-Factor. The higher factor was a
78
more challenging goal, but it also potentially permitted a greater return. s
The Commission concluded that this two-tiered system would pro-
vide an adequate incentive for each LEC to select the productivity factor
that most closely reflected its potential efficiency savings. 79 Though these
numbers were higher than previously proposed, the agency believed that
they represented "an increase in the overall challenge of the price cap plan
to the LECs, and substantially increased benefits to customers."
80
B. The FCC Implemented a Consumer Productivity Dividend to
Increase the Downward Pressure on Prices
In creating its price cap index, the Commission added to the produc-
tivity factors a consumer productivity dividend (CPD) of 0.5 percent. The
rationale for this extra adjustment was that historical LEC productivity
gains were under a rate-of-return system that provided less incentive for
carriers to improve efficiency.
Under the new system of price caps, carriers would have a greater in-
centive to improve and innovate, and thus the agency believed that LEC
productivity gains in the future would be far higher than in the past. The
Commission asserted that the productivity factors, which had been based
on a LEC's performance under a rate-of-return regime, needed to be in-
creased by the CPD in order to pass along these anticipated gains to con-
81
sumers.
In addition to this stated policy goal, the FCC may also have been
motivated by a desire to drive consumer prices down even faster. The
agency seemed to have great confidence in the ability of LECs to improve
their productivity after the transition to a price cap system. Given this po-
76. Dominant Carriers Second Report and Order, supra note 30, para. 99.
77. Id.
78. Id. para. 8.
79. Id.
80. Id. para. 74.
81. Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, Report and Order and
Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 4 F.C.C.R. 2873, para. 248, 66 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 372 (1989); see also Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carri-
ers, Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 F.C.C.R. 13,659, para. 94, 8
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 2005 (1995) [hereinafter Price Cap Fourth FNPRM] ("The CPD was
included in the X-Factor to reflect improvements in productivity that [the FCC] believed
would occur under price caps and to flow through some of the benefit of those anticipated
improvements immediately to consumers.").
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tential for productivity increases, the Commission may have assumed that
the additional cost to a LEC of the CPD would benefit the consumer even
further without harming the carriers. This also had the political appeal of
making the controversial price cap scheme more palatable to IXCs and
consumers.
C. Sharing Was Initially Instituted in the Event that the FCC Chose
the Wrong X-Factor and to Ensure that Ratepayers Shared in
Profits from Efficiency Gains
In addition to the X-Factor and CPD, the FCC, in 1990, instituted an-
other measure to ensure that the LECs would not receive windfall profits
and that consumers would share in the profits from improved efficiency.
The Commission created a procedure it termed "sharing." Under this doc-
trine, when a LEC's earnings exceeded a certain threshold, the LEC had to
reduce its price cap index for the following year to "share" a preset portion
of its earnings with customers.
82
The amount of the sharing would vary with the X-Factor the carrier
had chosen.83 A carrier choosing an X-Factor of 3.3 percent was permitted
to keep all returns up to 12.25 percent.84 For a rate of return between 12.25
percent and 16.25 percent, the LEC would share 50 percent of the addi-
tional profit with consumers.85 For a rate of return above 16.25 percent, the
LEC would share all the profits with ratepayers beyond that level.
86
On the other hand, if the LEC had chosen the more demanding X-
Factor of 4.3 percent, the respective sharing thresholds increased to 13.25
percent and 17.25 percent.87 Thus, a profit in excess of 13.25 percent was
shared 50:50 with ratepayers, and all profit over a 17.25 percent rate of
return was required to go toward reduction of access charges."
The result of sharing was to limit LEC profits from productivity im-
provements. The carrier did have a financial incentive to increase produc-
tivity, but if it proved too efficient in any given year, the extra profits
could not be retained. Thus, LECs would be forced to return excessive
profits generated by efficiency gains. A carrier that substantially improved
productivity in any given year might lose some of those savings, whereas a
82. Dominant Carriers Second Report and Order, supra note 30, paras. 120-25.
83. Except where specified, for the remainder of this Article, the CPD is included
within the X-Factor.
84. Dominant Carriers Second Report and Order, supra note 30, para. 123.
85. Id. para. 124.
86. Id. para. 125.
87. Id. para. 126. See also generally Frank & Lazarus, supra note 67.
88. Dominant Carriers Second Report and Order, supra note 30, para. 126.
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more mediocre carrier that improved performance only gradually over the
course of several years might retain all of its profits.
Moreover, because sharing required the Commission to review rates
of return, it in effect required the Commission to perform costly and diffi-
cult evaluations of the proper LEC profit margin. Thus, despite incentive-
based regulation under price caps, the Commission still engaged in a retro-
spective evaluation of LEC profit levels to limit profit achieved through
efficiency gains.
D. The Low-End Adjustment Was Established to Ensure that Rates
Did Not Become Confiscatory
While the FCC's sharing policy prevented a LEC from making a
windfall profit, the low-end adjustment kept the carrier from an exces-
sively low rate of return. Under the low-end adjustment, a LEC whose
rates were below the price cap, yet that still fell below the low-end adjust-
ment mark in a base year period, could raise its rates. This would ensure a
rate of return equal to the low-end figure.89
The FCC, however, did not want this price floor to reward LEC inef-
ficiency or poor performance; so the upward adjustment was allowed only
to one percentage point below the 11.25 percent rate of return-the LEC
was guaranteed only a 10.25 percent rate of return. Commission officials
also stated that they would "of course retain [their] authority and responsi-
bility to examine the management of the LECs to ensure that the low
earnings do not indicate mismanagement, fraud, or other misbehavior.
'pi
Adding this price floor to the price cap regime created a range of
prices in which the LEC, for better or worse, would remain. Under rate-of-
return regulation, the Commission regulated the exact profit a LEC could
earn. The price cap regulations as originally enacted in 1990 granted carri-
ers additional flexibility and a greater incentive to improve efficiency, but
shielded both producers and consumers from the full effects of market
forces.
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E. The Formula Incorporated Increases and Decreases for
"Exogenous Costs" Outside the Carrier's Control to Ensure
that Incentives Were Not Undermined and that the Carrier Did
Not Receive an Unfair Windfall
"Exogenous costs" are defined by the FCC as those costs that a LEC
saves "that are triggered by administrative, legislative or judicial action"
beyond a carrier's control.92 Because LECs cannot reduce such costs by
improving efficiency, the Commission separated these expenses in the
price cap incentive system. Without a separate adjustment for such costs,
the price cap regime could have led to unreasonably high or low rates.93 If
the carrier had to pay exogenous costs with the money saved from effi-
ciency gains, it would reduce the incentive for carriers to increase effi-
ciency. Furthermore, if exogenous costs were included in the rate of pro-
ductivity improvement, the carrier could gain a windfall profit without any
substantial improvement in efficiency.
The FCC has specified cost changes that may be considered exoge-
nous:
(i) The completion of the amortization of depreciation reserve de-
ficiencies;
(ii) Such changes in the Uniform System of Accounts
[requirements] ... ;
(iii) Changes in the Separations Manual;
(iv) Changes to the level of obligation associated with the Long
Term Support Fund and the Transitional Support Fund de-
scribed in [47 C.F.R.] § 69.612;
(v) The reallocation of investment from regulated to non-regulated
activities pursuant to [47 C.F.R.] § 64.901;
(vi) Such tax law changes and other extraordinary cost changes as
the Commission shall permit or require be treated as exogenous
by rule, rule waiver, or declaratory ruling;
(vii) Retargeting the [Price Cap Index] to the level specified by the
Commission for carriers whose base year earnings are below
the level of the lower adjustment mark;
(viii) Inside wire amortizations;
(ix) The completion of amortization of equal access expenses.94
92. Id. para. 166.
93. Id.
94. 47 C.F.R. § 61.45(d)(1)(i)-(ix) (1998). General tax law changes, costs of converting
to equal access, costs from changes in depreciation rates, and point of presence migration
are all presumptively endogenous, however. See Dominant Carriers Second Report and
Order, supra note 30, paras. 176, 180, 182, 188.
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Each of these items may entail significant costs for a LEC, but these
expenses would not directly affect a carrier's efficiency incentives because
it has no control over the amount of the costs. Therefore, the agency better
achieves its desired incentives by allowing the carrier to separate those
costs that it can reduce by improving productivity from those that it can-
not. The result is to permit efficiency gains to result in higher profits to the
LEC, where such a reward might not occur if exogenous costs were not
evaluated separately. Similarly, excluding exogenous costs precludes
LECs from relying on phantom efficiency gains, which have no impact on
a LEC's actual operating efficiency.
F. A System of Baskets and Bands Restricted Price Caps to Prevent
Cross-Subsidization
The Commission also wished to give LECs some discretion to mod-
ify pricing to achieve additional efficiencies. On the one hand, a simple
rule that gave LECs broad authority to make their own rates raised con-
cerns that the companies would engage in predatory pricing against com-
petitors, and subsidize this pricing by inflating rates in areas where no
competition existed.95 On the other hand, flexible pricing was desirable, as
it allowed "LECs to migrate their rates toward a set of prices that en-
hance[d] efficiency."'96 The more freedom that LECs had to set their own
prices in relation to the demand that existed for their services, the closer
the resemblance to an unregulated market. Moreover, making the range of
flexibility too narrow potentially would harm the LECs. The FCC set the
productivity factor and the CPD based on certain assumptions about the
amount of efficiency gains that the LECs could be expected to achieve in a
year. If the LECs were hamstrung by pricing options that were not broad
enough, they would have the worst of both worlds-declining prices based
on predicted productivity gains that could not be achieved.
To satisfy these competing concerns, the FCC adopted the baskets
and bands framework. First, the many services offered by LECs were split
into four distinct baskets or groups. The initial four baskets were: "(1)
common line services; (2) traffic sensitive services; (3) special access
services; and (4) interexchange services."97 A fifth basket was later addedS 98
for video dialtone services, followed by a sixth basket for marketing ex-
95. Dominant Carriers Second Report and Order, supra note 30, paras. 225-26.
96. Id. para. 35.
97. Id. para. 201.
98. See Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers; Treatment of
Video Dialtone Services Under Price Cap Regulation, Second Report and Order and Third
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 F.C.C.R. 11,098, 78 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
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penses. 99 These baskets encompassed a variety of different services that a
LEC could offer.
The price cap was applied to each overall group. Thus, the overall
basket could not exceed the price cap. This reduced the risk that lower-
priced services in competitive markets could be supported by higher prices
in noncompetitive segments because it limited the extent to which prices
for individual services could vary in relation to one another.0°
The FCC then created "bands" of prices. Essentially, the band was an
annual 5 percent margin above and a 5 percent margin below the actual
price cap.'0' The Commission would presume tariffs that fell within the
band were reasonable. The reason for the upper limit was to protect rate-
payers from radical price hikes by the LECs. Some commentators at the
time of implementation argued that the establishment of a 5 percent upper
band would have the practical effect of raising prices by that amount be-
cause all LECs would set their prices at the maximum amount allowed by
law.' °3 The FCC rejected this reasoning, saying that in its experience, ac-
cess charges had been coming down, and it saw no reason to believe that
LECs would automatically raise rates as high as possible every year.104
On the other side, there was also disagreement about implementing a
band below the price cap. Some LECs argued that no good reason existed
to impose a floor on the prices that they could charge. This position,
which relied on the logic that lower prices necessarily must be good for
ratepayers, was also rejected by the Commission. The FCC noted that al-
lowing LECs to set prices as low as they chose would increase the danger
of predatory pricing as the LECs might try to undercut newly developing
competition.' °6 Thus, the band did not completely foreclose the LECs from
setting lower prices, but it did require that if they wished to go below the
1573 (1995). The basket for video dialtone service has little continuing relevance today be-
cause Congress eliminated video dialtone service in the 1996 Telecommunications Act. See
47 U.S.C. § 573 (Supp. II 1996); see also Price Cap Fourth Report and Order, supra note
52, para. 182.
99. See Access Charge Reform et al., First Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 15,982,
paras. 323-24, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1209 (1997) [hereinafter Access Charge Reform First
Report and Order].
100. Dominant Carriers Second Report and Order, supra note 30, para. 221.
101. Id. para. 223.
102. Id. paras. 224-26.
103. Id. para. 225 (citations omitted).
104. Id.
105. Id. para. 226 (citations omitted).
106. Id.
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allowed amount (5 percent), they must show the charged price was above
the cost of providing the service.'0
The basket and band policy thus sought to glean the benefits of truly
variable prices, such as increased efficiency and more innovative service,
while preventing some of the perceived harms that would come from a
completely deregulated approach. However, the policy as adopted did re-
ceive significant criticism from the LECs, which argued that the FCC had
not set the balance properly by making the range of pricing too narrow.108
This jeopardized the ability of the LECs to meet the efficiency targets that
the FCC had set out. Because under the new regime the LECs' profitability
was defined by whether they met (or exceeded) these targets, it was a seri-
ous concern.
IV. SUBSEQUENT MODIFICATIONS TO THE ORIGINAL PRICE
CAP SCHEME
As originally envisioned, price caps were to introduce market forces
into telephone pricing. In practice, however, the FCC proved less willing
to leave LECs and consumers to market disciplines and incentives. This
section describes various ways in which the original price cap regime was
modified--often in ways that seemed to regress to the discredited princi-
ples of rate-of-return regulation.
A. The FCC Repeatedly Increased the Productivity Factor and
Retroactively Adjusted Earlier Period Indexes to Account for the
Higher Productivity Factors
Initially, the FCC's data led it to conclude that the Factor should be
3.3 percent because that figure best reflected the agency's empirical stud-
ies about how much LEC productivity increases had surpassed those of the
general economy. '1 9 The agency, however, modified that initial conclusion.
In 1995, the FCC increased the basic X-Factor from 3.3 percent to 4.0 per-
cent.11° Most recently, the Commission voted in May 1997 to require a newX-Factor of 6.5 percent.'
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. para. 100.
110. Price Cap First Report and Order, supra note 67, para. 209. As with the initial
system, the Commission again allowed carriers to choose among various X-Factors--4.0%,
4.7%, or 5.3%----each corresponding to a different sharing obligation. Id. paras. 214-15.
This decision was subsequently upheld by the D.C. Court of Appeals in Bell Atlantic Tele-
phone Company v. FCC, 79 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
111. Price Cap Fourth Report and Order, supra note 52, para. 18. In this Order, the
Commission adopted the single 6.5% X-Factor and eliminated sharing.
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The agency's explanation for raising the X-Factor to 6.5 percent was
that it had adopted a new method for calculating the productivity factor.'
Rather than simply relying on historic data, the FCC switched to a consid-
eration of what it called "total factor productivity" (TFP), which examined
the ratio of total output to total input.' 3 Output and input are measured by
indices, with the output index representing the quantities of goods and
services produced, and the input index measuring the quantities of capital,
labor, and materials used in production.'14 The goal of a TFP analysis is "to
isolate the real change in productivity." 5"
In addition to raising the X-Factor to 6.5 percent, the FCC, in 1997,
retroactively adjusted earlier period indexes to account for the higher pro-
ductivity factors. The Commission required each LEC to adjust its price
cap index effective July 1, 1997, to the levels for the 1997-1998 tariff year
that would have been in effect had the agency adopted the 6.5 percent X-
Factor in time for the LECs' 1996 annual filings.'16 The reason for this ret-
roactive change was that the FCC believed the interim productivity factor
of 4.0 percent adopted in 1995 "understate[d] LEC industry productivity
growth."117 Consequently, the agency concluded "that allowing all of the
past two years of understated productivity to become permanently in-
grained in LEC [price cap indices] would not strike the proper balance
between stockholder and ratepayer interests."]" The Commission thought
carriers had notice that the 4.0 percent productivity factor was only in-
terim, and thus the FCC believed it was reasonable to adjust the price cap
retroactively to apply to the 1997-1998 tariff year.] 9
Carriers on both sides challenged the Commission's conclusion in the
court of appeals. Long-distance carriers argued that the X-Factor had been
set too low. Local carriers challenged the Order as a result-driven political
deal with the long-distance carriers. Media reports at the time of the Order
indicated that the Commission had reached a deal with AT&T under which
AT&T would pass along certain access charge reductions to consumers.120
112. Id. para. 19.
113. Id. paras. 8-9.
114. Id. para. 9.
115. Id. para. 30. Under the old regime, changes in prices had a more pronounced impact
on the X-Factor. Total factor productivity attempted to limit this effect.
116. Id. para. 179.
117. Id. para. 178.
118. Id. para. 179.
119. Id.
120. Ola Kinnander, AT&T Puts Pressure on FCC to Reduce Access Charges More than
Had Been Expected, COMm. TODAY, May 6, 1997, at 1; John M. Broder, AT&T to Lower
Long-Distance Rates, INT'L HERALD TRi., May 5, 1997, at 15.
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In exchange, the Commission would agree to cut access charges by $1.7
billion. The local carriers argued that this "deal" led the Commission to
manipulate the X-Factor data and apply it retroactively in order to reach
the preordained reduction level.'22 The Commission responded that the
Price Cap decision represented reasoned decision making based on the to-
tality of a highly complex record. These issues are pending an appeal in
the D.C. Circuit as of February 11, 1999.
B. The FCC Eliminated the Multiple Productivity Factor Choices
Under the initial Price Cap Order in 1990, the agency had allowed
the carriers to choose between different X-Factors: the standard one of 3.3
percent or a higher factor of 4.3 percent. Choosing a higher X-Factor de-
manded greater efficiency gains, but also offered a greater potential for
profit.
2 4
In 1997, after expanding the multiple X-Factor approach in 1995, the
FCC decided that a higher X-Factor of 6.5 percent would be the only one
permitted.' Carriers could no longer choose among different rates. The
Commission's rationale was that: (1) most LECs had chosen the highest X-
Factor; (2) the low-end adjustment mechanism was sufficient to address
any heterogeneity existing among price cap LECs; and (3) permitting mul-
tiple X-Factors would attach differential sharing obligations that might un-
dermine economic efficiency. 126 The FCC also thought that requiring a sin-
gle X-Factor would simplify the FCC rules and prevent LECs from
"gaming the system" by increasing profits without improving productivity
• 127
growth by shifting between different X-Factor options.
C. The FCC Refused to Eliminate the Consumer Productivity
Dividend
The consumer productivity dividend, as originally conceived, was to
compensate for anticipated gains in LEC productivity after the initial tran-
sition from rate-of-return regulation to price caps.' 2 Consequently, many
121. See supra note 120.
122. Initial Brief for Local Exchange Carrier Petitioners at 7-13, United States Tel.
Ass'n v. FCC, No. 97-1469 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 30, 1998) (on file with author).
123. United States Tel. Ass'n v. FCC, No. 97-1469 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 30, 1998).
124. See supra Part III.A.
125. Price Cap Fourth Report and Order, supra note 52, paras. 156-61.
126. Id. paras. 157-58.
127. Id. para. 159.
128. See supra Part III.B.
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observers thought that the CPD would disappear once the transition took
place.
129
Instead, the FCC opted to retain the consumer productivity dividend.
It disagreed that "the passage of time by itself has eliminated the need for a
CPD. The CPD remains necessary to require LECs to transfer some por-
tion to their unit cost reductions to their access customers.... The passage
of time has not altered the need to strike this balance between ratepayer
and shareholder interests.' 3 °
This explanation seemed cryptic if not curt. Perhaps thinking a more
detailed justification necessary, FCC Commissioner Rachelle B. Chong is-
sued a separate statement addressing this issue. Commissioner Chong said:
I recognize that some have argued that the CPD was initially adopted
as a way to flow through the first benefits of the price cap plan to ac-
cess charge customers, and that it may be time to bid the CPD a fond
farewell. Given the current state of competition in most price cap LEC
markets, we have decided to continue use of the CPD as a way to en-
sure that productivity gains realized by the LEC will be shared be-
tween ratepayers and shareholders. In the future, however, a Commis-
sion may decide that competition has progressed to the stage where a
CPD mechanism could be safely discarded because market forces will
provide consumers with the benefit of the LEC's productivity.131
Yet Commissioner Chong's statement was more an acknowledgment
of the problem than it was a justification. Few people would dispute that
the FCC still must balance the interests of ratepayers and shareholders; but
what was remarkable about the agency's explanation is how little it ex-
plained. The justification for the CPD's existence-the added productivity
gains from the initial transfer to a price cap system-occurred almost eight
years ago. Yet the FCC's official report never explained why "the passage
of time" would not remove the need for the CPD. Logically, it would, and
the agency's public statement gave no explanation about why this logic
should not apply. Perhaps the Commission feared the abolition of sharing
might create an unjust windfall to the LECs, but the higher X-Factor,
crafted through a TFP analysis to gain the most accurate result, was de-
signed to prevent that.
The agency's stated rationale for preserving the CPD was to ensure
that efficiency savings flowed through to consumers, but the FCC had
raised the X-Factor to do exactly that. The real question-left unanswered
in the record-was why the newly increased and allegedly more accurate
X-Factor did not obviate the CPD.
129. See Price Cap Fourth Report and Order, supra note 52, para. 125.
130. Id.
131. Id. (statement of Comm'r Rachelle B. Chong).
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If the agency's objective was to pass efficiency savings along to con-
sumers, raising the X-Factor or even retaining the sharing program would
have accomplished that goal with a closer connection to the agency's
stated policy goal and on a rational, reasoned basis. There was little need
to muddy this already complex area of law by extending the CPD's life-
time without credible explanation.1
2
D. The FCC Reduced Eligible Exogenous Costs
In 1995, the FCC modified the original exogenous cost rules to deny
exogenous treatment for accounting rule changes that do not affect a car-
rier's real economic costs. 33 The agency instituted an "economic cost
standard" intended to limit exogenous cost treatment of cost fluctuations
resulting from changes in the FCC's uniform accounting requirements.'3
Exogenous cost treatment was limited "to economic cost changes caused
by administrative, legislative, or judicial requirements beyond the control
of the carriers that are not reflected in the [Gross Domestic Product Price
Index].' 35 The agency believed that "[b]y narrowing this exception, effi-
ciency incentives should improve." 3 6 The concern was to avoid double
counting.137 Because the price cap index already was adjusted for inflation,
the agency did not wish to include the same cost increase under both the
inflation and the exogenous cost categories. To do so would grant the LEC
additional profits without requiring any greater increases in efficiency.
In framing the new rule, the Commission focused on a LEC's dis-
counted cash flows. According to the FCC, a change in accounting rules
that affects a carrier's discounted cash flow represents a true change in
economic costs and opportunity. 3 Thus, it should merit classification as
an exogenous cost. On the other hand, a change in accounting rules that
132. On appeal, the agency argued for the first time that the extension of the CPD was
needed due to the elimination of sharing. Without sharing, the Commission argued, carriers
would have greater profit incentive to be efficient, making past productivity experiences
with sharing consistently lower than could now be expected. The Commission's Order was
cryptic at best on this point. The seeming post-hoc explanation for retention of the CPD led
to charges by local carriers that the adjustment was retained as part of a political deal to
lower access charges by a specific predetermined amount. See generally Initial Brief for
Federal Communications Commission at 37-40, United States Tel. Ass'n v. FCC, No. 97-
1469 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 30, 1998) (on file with author).
133. Price Cap First Report and Order, supra note 67, paras. 293-303.
134. Id. paras. 294-95.
135. Id. para. 294.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. para. 295.
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does not affect discounted cash flow or opportunity costs should not be
eligible for exogenous treatment.
139
E. The FCC Eliminated Sharing but Not the Low-End Adjustment
At the same time it was tightening the eligibility for exogenous costs,
the FCC in 1995 questioned whether it should continue to include a shar-
ing mechanism in its price cap formula: "Based on our experience over the
initial four years of LEC price cap regulation and the extensive record de-
veloped in this proceeding, we conclude that the sharing mechanism is not
essential to ensuring that LEC rates under price cap regulation remain just
and reasonable."' 14 Although the FCC did not eliminate sharing at that
time, it noted that a sufficiently high X-Factor could fulfill the same pur-
pose of benefiting consumers.14
In 1997, the FCC formally removed the sharing requirement "as part
of [its] overall strategy to devise a more deregulatory and efficiency-
enhancing regulatory framework."' 42 The agency believed that eliminating
sharing removed a "major vestige" of rate-of-return regulation and in the
future would facilitate more deregulation as local markets opened to com-
petition.
141
The Commission thought that the sharing system "severely blunt[ed]
the efficiency incentives of price cap regulation by reducing the rewards of
LEC efforts and decisions."'" If the LEC would not gain the profits from a
remarkable increase in productivity, it had far less incentive to achieve
tremendous productivity improvements. If a higher X-Factor created fur-
ther incentives, however, the LECs would receive the marginal profits and
thus had a strong incentive to continue to improve productivity. At the
same time, consumers would benefit from the lower costs LECs charged
long-distance providers for using the local network to complete an inter-
state telephone call.
The FCC, however, did not remove the low-end adjustment. 45 It
feared that in its absence, the higher X-Factor might force the LECs to
charge unreasonably low rates. 46 The profit cap on productivity improve-
139. Id. paras. 294-95.
140. Id. para. 16.
141. Id.
142. Price Cap Fourth Report and Order, supra note 52, para. 146.
143. Id.
144. Id. para. 148.
145. Id. para. 11 ("To guard against our new X-Factor requiring individual LECs to
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ments disappeared-the profit floor did not. Of course, the carriers still
faced a much higher X-Factor and the retention of the CPD, but retention
of the low-end adjustment did serve to limit any potential damage.
F. The FCC Modified New Services Pricing and Procedural Rules
"New services" are those that "add to the range of options already
available to consumers. [They] may, but need not, include a new technol-
ogy or functional capability."' 147 New services are not included under the
price cap indices until "the first annual price cap tariff filing after the com-
pletion of the base year in which the new service becomes effective."'
48
Local exchange carriers may charge a "reasonable" level of the overhead
costs of a new service. 49 New services subject to LEC price caps must be
disclosed to the FCC with at least forty-five-days' notice; such disclosure
must also be accompanied by a detailed cost report showing that "the LEC
has used a consistent costing methodology for direct costs 'for all related
services." 5 °
In 1995, the Commission gave the LECs greater flexibility to lower
prices within service category bands. The lower pricing bands were ex-
panded by an additional 5 percent to allow the LECs additional downward
pricing flexibility.152 Some critics had objected that this might increase the
risk of predation, create unreasonable discrimination by departing from
fully distributed cost pricing, and allow the LECs to abuse pricing flexibil-
' 53
ity to foreclose competitive entry. The agency did not find these con-
cerns compelling, and it concluded, "we believe that any increased risk of
such conduct is outweighed by the benefits that consumers will receive
from lower prices."'m However, the FCC promised to "continue to review
new services tariff filings for possible discrimination." 1
5
147. Dominant Carriers Second Report and Order, supra note 30, para. 314.
148. Id. para. 312.
149. Amendments of Part 69 of the Commission's Rules Relating to the Creation of Ac-
cess Charge Subelements for Open Network Architecture; Policy and Rules Concerning
Rates for Dominant Carriers, Report and Order & Order on Further Reconsideration &
Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 6 F.C.C.R. 4524, para. 38, 69 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 641 (1991).
150. Price Cap First Report and Order, supra note 67, para. 394 (citation omitted).
151. Id. paras. 24-26.
152. ld. para. 26.
153. Id. para. 409.
154. Id. para. 410.
155. Id. para. 418.
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G. The FCC Began to View Price Caps Not as a Permanent
Replacement for Rate-of-Return Regulation, but Rather as a
Transition to Local Exchange Competition
In 1995, the FCC undertook a "comprehensive review" of the LEC
price caps, focusing specifically on whether the original policy goals
should be modified. 56 The agency reaffirmed its conviction about the su-
periority of competition to regulation and its rationale for price caps:
"[W]e adopted the current price cap system which, we believed, was not
only superior to rate-of-return regulation, but could also act as a transi-
tional system as LEC regulated services became subject to greater compe-
tition. 157 The goal was not merely to replace rate-of-return regulation but
to "replicate the competitive outcome" present in the marketplace. 58 In
that light, the Commission continues to believe price caps are a transitional
device meant to allow the FCC to gradually reduce regulation as the LECs
move from a fully regulated service to a competitive local exchange mar-
ketplace even if many of the implementation features of the FCC's regu-
latory regime suggest that the FCC views price caps as a more permanent
fixture."'
In sum, the 1997 changes to the initial 1990 Price Cap Order were
substantial: The X-Factor was raised significantly; the CPD was retained;
sharing was eliminated; and multiple productivity factors were abolished.
V. EXPERIENCE WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF PRICE CAPS AT
THE STATE LEVEL
Changes in LEC regulation are not limited to the federal government.
In fact, some state legislatures and public utilities commissions were ahead
of the FCC in adopting alternative regulatory plans for telecommunica-
tions companies. The Commission noted that as of 1990, California, Illi-
nois, Kansas, Michigan, New York, and Wisconsin had implemented vari-
ants of the price cap scheme.'6' Since then, other states, such as Alabama,
Maine, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, and Vir-
ginia have followed this lead.
61
156. Id. para. 5.
157. Id. para. 64.
158. Id. paras. 91-92.
159. Frank & Lazarus, supra note 67, at 27.
160. Dominant Carriers Second Report and Order, supra note 30, paras. 41-44. Fink,
supra note 52, at 204.
161. See supra note 160.
162. Re South Central Bell Tel. Co., 164 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 324 (Ala. P.S.C.
1995); Re New England Tel. & Tel., 162 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 38 (Me. P.U.C. 1995);
Re BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 168 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 438 (N.C. U.C. 1996); Re
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The price cap systems adopted at the state level are broadly similar to
the FCC's regime. The division of services into baskets, for example, is an
almost universal reaction to the problem posed by cross-subsidization. It is
also common to find a productivity factor (an "X-Factor") to take into ac-
count the declining cost nature of the telecommunications industry. How-
ever, despite these general similarities, many of the state plans differ sig-
nificantly from the FCC's structure. For example, several states apply
different price caps to different service baskets. The state productivity
factors are frequently much lower than that imposed by the FCC, and the
use of a consumer productivity dividend (CPD or stretch factor) is quite
rare at the state level. In fact, California, one of the few states that initially
adopted such a factor, recently eliminated it. The extensive state experi-
ences with price caps should inform any analysis of possible price cap
modifications. More specifically, states like California, which have a long
history with price caps in a large market, may offer significant guidance
for future FCC reforms.
A. Some States Have Implemented Different Price Caps for
Different Service Baskets
When the FCC adopted an incentive-based system to regulate the
largest LECs in 1990, it noted: "The productivity offset we have defined
was selected on the basis of total company performance, not the perform-
ance of individual 'baskets' of services or on a service-specific basis."'
163
Thus, the FCC applied the same productivity offset and price cap structure
to all of the services offered by the LECs, regardless of their basket
grouping. Some states have rejected this universal, one-size-fits-all ap-
proach and have instead created different price caps for different service
baskets, generally easing price cap restrictions in areas where competition
has either already developed or is in the process of doing so.' 64
In South Carolina, for instance, the Public Service Commission ap-
proved a plan that divided the LEC's services into three baskets: basic, in-
Implementation of Chapter 30 of the Public Utility Code, Streamline Form of Regulation
M-00930483, 1995 WL 809963 (Pa. P.U.C. Apr. 13, 1995); Re BellSouth, 169 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 144 (S.C. P.S.C. 1996); Re New England Tel. & Tel., 157 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 112 (Vt. P.S.B. 1994); Re Telephone Regulatory Methods, 157 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 465 (Va. S.C.C. 1994).
163. Dominant Carriers Second Report and Order, supra note 30, para. 210.
164. Re South Central Bell Tel. Co., 164 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 324; Re Bell Atl.-
Washington, D.C., Inc., 173 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 55 (D.C. P.S.C. 1996); Re Alterna-
tive Forms of Regulating Tel. Cos., 174 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 120 (Md. P.S.C. 1996);
Re BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 168 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 438; Re BellSouth, 169
Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 144.
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terconnection, and non-basic. 65 Both the basic and interconnection service
baskets are governed by a three-year rate freeze, after which they may be
increased by the amount of inflation (determined by the Gross Domestic
Product-Price Index (GDP-PI)), less a 2.1 percent productivity factor.1
However, the price of services in the non-basic basket, which includes
services that are deemed to face competition from other sources, may be
raised by as much as 20 percent in any given twelve-month period, after
the expiration of a five-year rate freeze.' 67
Alabama has adopted a very similar structure that also uses three
baskets called basic, interconnection, and non-basic. The basic category,
which includes all of the services necessary for either a business or resi-
dential consumer to make a local call, is capped for five years, after which
South Central Bell and any other LEC adopting this regulatory plan can
increase prices by the GDP-PI minus a set productivity factor of 3 percent
for South Central Bell and 1 percent for non-South Central Bell LECs. 69
The Commission further ruled that intrastate interconnection services
would be tied to the interstate rates set by the FCC, reduced by 2.5 cents
per minute (phased in over a three-year period). The price of non-basic
services, after a freeze of twelve months, may be raised by as much as 10
171
percent per year.
In North Carolina, the Utilities Commission split the LECs' services
into five, rather than three, different baskets: basic, non-basic 1, non-basic
1722, interconnection, and toll switched access. The Commission applied a
cap of GDP-PI minus a 2 percent productivity factor to the basic basket, a
cap of GDP-PI minus 3 percent to the non-basic 1 and interconnection
baskets, a total freeze on prices in the toll switched access group, and left
the prices in the non-basic 2 group unregulated, allowing the LECs total
pricing flexibility in that area.171
Finally, in Washington, D.C., the Public Service Commission has
adopted a three-basket approach, dividing LEC services into basic, discre-
165. Re BellSouth, 169 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 144.
166. There is also a 5% band similar to the one used by the FCC, described supra Part
III.F.
167. Re BellSouth, 169 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 144.
168. Re South Central Bell Tel. Co., 164 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 324.
169. Id. at 333.
170. Id. at 335.
171. Id. at 334-35.
172. Re BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 168 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 438 (N.C. U.C.
1996).
173. Non-basic 2 includes Centrex, billing, and collection services. Basic is defined as
those services necessary to make a local call, and non-basic 1 is the catch-all category. Id. at
471.
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tionary, and competitive. 74 The basic basket is restricted to an increase of
GDP-PI minus 3 percent, while prices for discretionary services may be
increased up to 15 percent per year. 75 Services defined as "competitive"
are not subject to any pricing restrictions; prices in that category are en-
tirely subject to the discretion of the LEC.176 As with the other states, the
D.C. Commission decided that the presence of competition in the market
for certain services justified the removal of price regulation, as the free
market would be able to adequately control the prices of these services.
It should be pointed out that these decisions all post-date the initial
FCC implementation of price caps in 1990 by at least five years, and that
by 1995, it was far more apparent that competition would become a feature
of the LEC landscape than it had seemed in 1990. The FCC itself recog-
nized this, by stating that the flexibility offered by price caps "gives the
LECs the ability to adjust their prices to a limited extent in response to
competitive entry." 1" There have, however, been two major overhauls to
the FCC price cap system since it was first announced, in 1995 and 1997;
in each case, the FCC declined to pursue a course similar to the one
adopted by the states. 178
B. States Typically Set Much Lower Productivity Offsets than
Those Used by the FCC
The FCC began in 1990 by offering two different X-Factors, which
brought with them different sharing requirements. These X-Factors were
2.8 percent and 3.8 percent, plus the addition of a 0.5 percent consumer
productivity dividend, which brought the total to 3.3 percent and 4.3 per-
cent. 179 In 1995, the number of X-Factors was increased to three, and the
FCC continued with a 0.5 percent consumer productivity dividend, bring-
ing the total offsets from 4.5 percent to 5.3 percent.1 80 Last year, the FCC
eliminated the multiple X-Factors, moving to a single, 6.0 percent figure,
that yielded a total offset of 6.5 percent (when combined with the CPD). 8'
Despite the gradual increase in the total productivity offset that the
FCC has favored, most states use X-Factors much closer to the 2.8 percent




177. Price Cap First Report and Order, supra note 67, para. 4.
178. For a detailed discussion of the changes that the FCC made in 1995 and 1997, see
supra Part IV.
179. Dominant Carriers Second Report and Order, supra note 30, para. 99.
180. Price Cap First Report and Order, supra note 67, para. 214.
181. Price Cap Fourth Report and Order, supra note 52, para. 144.
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figure (without the CPD) initially used by the FCC as its lowest offset.
States with X-Factors in this range include Kansas (3.0 percent), Pennsyl-
vania (2.93 percent), North Carolina (2.0 percent), South Carolina (2.1
percent), and Alabama (3.0 percent); the District of Columbia also uses a
3.0 percent offset.' 82 Maryland ties its X-Factor to a three-year average of
the Consumer Price Index, which recently has averaged approximately 3
percent."' Indeed, a survey of all states that have adopted productivity
factors, cited by the Kansas Corporation Commission, reveals that the na-
tional average is 2.6 percent.
C. The Use of a Consumer Productivity Dividend, in Addition to
the X-Factor, Is Uncommon at the State Level
While there is almost universal recognition among the states that an
X-Factor is required to take into account the productivity differential be-
tween LECs and the rest of the economy, states use a consumer productiv-
ity dividend or "stretch" factor much less frequently. Illinois is an example
of the rare case, using a 1 percent consumer productivity dividend that is
added to the differential productivity growth measure (the X-Factor). W
However, unlike the FCC's X-Factor, which is 6 percent, Illinois' X-
Factor is only 1.3 percent. 86 Many states, like California, have eliminated
this stretch factor based on their analysis of the potential efficiency gains
now available to carriers.
For example, Kansas has decided that the inclusion of a stretch factorS 187
is not appropriate. Dismissing the FCC's decision to include such a divi-
dend as unpersuasive, the Kansas Corporation Commission found that a
stretch factor would not produce any benefit: "The LECs have existing in-
centives to achieve the greatest possible efficiencies." 188 The Commission
182. Re South Central Bell Tel. Co., 164 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 324 (Ala. P.S.C.
1995); Re Bell Atl.-Washington, D.C., Inc., 173 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 55 (D.C. P.S.C.
1996); Re Telecommunications Industry, No. 190, 492-U, 94-GIMT-478-GIT, 1996 WL
938814, at *9 (Kan. S.C.C. Dec. 27, 1996); Re Alternative Forms of Regulating Tel. Cos.,
174 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 120 (Md. P.S.C. 1996); Re BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 168
Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 438 (N.C. U.C. 1996); Re Implementation of Chapter 30 of the
Public Utility Code, Streamline Form of Regulation M-00930483, 1995 WL 809963 (Pa.
P.U.C. Apr. 13, 1995); Re BellSouth, 169 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 144 (S.C. P.S.C.
1996).
183. Re Alternative Forms of Regulating Tel. Cos., 174 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at
120.
184. Re Telecommunications Industry, 1996 WL 938814, at *16.
185. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 669 N.E.2d 919, 927 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1996).
186. Id.
187. Re Telecommunications Industry, 1996 WL 938814.
188. Id. at *16.
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went on to set the X-Factor at 3 percent, which it felt was in line with the
average of 2.6 percent used in other states. 8 9
The Public Service Commission in Maryland made a similar decision
in Re Alternative Forms of Regulating Telephone Companies.' 90 There, the
Commission adopted a rate regulation plan broadly similar to the one used
by the FCC, including baskets, bands, and a productivity factor. The
Commission declined, however, to impose an additional stretch factor,
concluding that the Consumer Price Index served as a reasonable "proxy
for expected future productivity gains," and was thus all that was neces-
191
sary.
The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission "specifically reject[ed]
the inclusion of a stretch factor" in LEC price cap regulation.' 92 In addition
to concluding that a stretch factor added nothing to a properly determined
X-Factor, the Commission was concerned that inclusion of a stretch factor
might actually damage the accuracy of the regulation.9 It noted, "we are
faced with both the uncertainty of the stretch factor theory and the relative
imprecision of the estimated factor values available to us in this proceed-
ing.' ' 94 The Commission went on to conclude that an X-Factor of 2.8 per-
cent was appropriate.195
Finally, California, which adopted a consumer productivity dividend
when it first went to alternative regulation, has recently eliminated this
stretch factor as a component of calculating the X-Factor.'9' The California
Public Utilities Commission, in fact, engaged in a sweeping overhaul of its
price cap system, which the FCC had once cited as being the "most simi-
lar" to the FCC's own regulations. 197 This reform not only eliminated the
0.5 percent stretch factor, it also froze the application of the price cap for-
198
mula, which effectively equates the X-Factor to the GDP-PI. This re-duced the X-Factor from 5 percent to roughly 3 percent.19 The California
189. Id.
190. Re Alternative Forms of Regulating Tel. Cos., 174 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 120,
120-62 (Md. P.S.C. 1996).
191. Id. at 120.
192. Re Implementation of Chapter 30 of the Public Utility Code, 1995 WL 809963, at




196. Re Incentive-Based Regulatory Framework for Local Exchange Carriers, 167 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 1 (Ca. P.U.C. 1995).
197. Dominant Carriers Second Report and Order, supra note 30, para. 42.
198. Re Incentive-Based Regulatory Framework for Local Exchange Carriers, 167 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 1.
199. Id. at 1-6.
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Commission concluded that the LECs had "achieved [all of] the easy gains
by becoming highly efficient," and that while additional gains in efficiency
were certainly possible, it was "unrealistic to believe that [LECs] can con-
tinue to realize additional efficiency gains at current levels." 200 Because of
increased competition and the fact that "simple productivity gains realized
in the initial years of price cap regulation ha[d] come to an end," the use of
a stretch factor was "no longer appropriate public policy."20' The Commis-
sion was persuaded that the declining revenues shown by Pacific Bell were
caused in part by an overly onerous obligation to reduce rates, which was
prompted by an overly high X-Factor combined with the consumer pro-
ductivity dividend.2
Thus, while solid consensus does not exist on the use of consumer
productivity dividends among the states, several states have concluded for
similar reasons that such a stretch factor is unnecessary if the productivity
differential is properly determined. Moreover, a number of states have also
determined that the inclusion of a stretch factor can do more harm than
good by making the total obligation of LECs more arbitrary than it would
otherwise be.
VI. EVALUATION OF THE PRICE CAP VOYAGE
As often happens, the difference between theory and practice does
not become apparent except through years of experience. After eight years,
all parties should have witnessed enough results to evaluate whether the
theory of price caps was successfully implemented in practice and whether
jettisoning rate-of-return regulation was a wise decision.
Massive criticism has been leveled at the FCC over the implementa-
tion of price caps from both LECs and access customers. Local exchange
carriers, on the one hand, although preferring price caps to rate of return,
would have the FCC make the entire scheme more flexible. 203 These LECs
are not lobbying for access price increases, per se. Rather, they argue that
they should be given the flexibility to shape their offerings in response to
customer needs and competitive offerings.'04 Interexchange carriers, on the
. 205
other hand, would have the FCC make the scheme more rigid. In fact
200. Id. at 17.
201. Id. at 18-19.
202. Id. at 25.
203. Price Cap Fourth Report and Order, supra note 52, para. 161.
204. Id. paras. 165-67; see also Price Cap First Report and Order, supra note 67, paras.
71-72.
205. See, e.g., Price Cap Fourth Report and Order, supra note 52, paras. 25-28, 37-38;
Access Charge Reform First Report and Order, supra note 99, paras. 162-64.
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they often make arguments that appear more aimed at repealing the entire
system than at reforming it.206
All parties have argued that the Commission has often been slow to
implement changes to price caps that reflect market and regulatory
changes. The agency has dribbled these changes out over years, thus exac-
erbating regulatory uncertainty and undermining the very goals it hopes to
achieve. For example, by the time of its four-year review in 1995, the FCC
was already moving in the direction of adopting a total factor productivity
measure for the X-Factor. The Commission was also considering the
elimination of sharing. The four-year review contained requests for com-
ments on both of these topics; however, the changes were finally imple-
mented in 1997. In adopting price caps four years before, the Commission
had been careful to develop a price cap system that could serve as a per-
manent regulatory replacement for rate of return. By the time of the re-
view, the FCC had begun to speak of the price cap regime as affording the
flexibility necessary for LECs to make the transition from being regulated
utilities to competitive telecommunications service providers.
Who is right? Sifting through the rhetoric, the implementation of
price caps at the federal level has had both its plusses and minuses. With
the clear majority of states following the FCC's lead by moving to price
caps for local services, the regulatory community obviously views price
cap theory as conceptually appealing. Most of these policymakers appear
to conclude that the positives outweigh the negatives. In fact, as described
below, with some significant modifications to bring the program back in
line with its underlying principles, these minuses would be even less
problematic than they are today.
A. The FCC's Price Cap Regulations Generated Substantial
Benefits
1. The Elimination of Sharing Bolstered the Efficiency-Producing
Impact of Price Cap Regulation
The sharing concept has often been referred to by the FCC as a
"backstop" mechanism to ensure that ratepayers were not being over-
206. Interexchange carrier arguments that access charges be prescribed based on "total
service long run incremental costs" (TSLRIC) is nothing more than a demand that access
rates be set in accordance with rate-of-return principles, thereby eliminating the last eight
years' impact of incentive-based prices. See Access Charge Reform et al., MCI WorldCom,
Inc. Comments, CC Docket Nos. 92-262, 94-1, RM-9210, at 22-27 (Oct. 26, 1998) (urging
the FCC to base access charges on "forward-looking economic costs") (on file with author);
cf. Access Charge Reform First Report and Order, supra note 99, paras. 294-95 (rejecting
IXC requests that costs be prescribed according to TSLRIC).
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charged because the FCC failed to accurately set the X-Factor .2 07 In other
words, it was thought to protect against an X-Factor that was set too low,
and thus return "excess profits" to ratepayers to "correct" for this potential
error.208 Obviously, the concept has a clear rate-of-return flavor, where
customers are given "refunds" of "excess earnings," except that with
sharing, carriers "share" with ratepayers the profits that exceeded the
"sharing zones. ' 2 9
Since the theory behind price caps is to encourage carriers to become
more efficient by allowing them to keep earnings that exceed the tradi-
tional rate of return by increasing output or reducing costs, the idea of re-
quiring LECs to give back to ratepayers some of those "rewards" for be-
coming more efficient must have a dampening effect on the efficiency
motivation of price caps. Although there is some question about how pre-
cisely a company can gauge its efficiency improvements, one might expect
that, when sharing is eliminated completely, steps to improve efficiency
can proceed full steam ahead with confidence that those steps will be fully
rewarded.21°
Interexchange carriers, of course, have criticized the elimination of
sharing, claiming that this mechanism is still necessary, in part because
they believe that the FCC has not set the productivity factor high
enough.21' These parties never appear to directly contest the premise that
212
sharing has a dampening impact on efficiency. Eliminating sharing also
enables the FCC to jettison some regulatory requirements that are relics of
the rate-of-return era retained solely because sharing requires a detailed
examination of earnings. For instance, the FCC continues to be concerned
about misassignment of costs, even though cost assignments have no im-
207. Price Cap Fourth Report and Order, supra note 52, para. 154.
208. See supra Part 11I.C.
209. -In fact, the FCC itself has actually referred to sharing as a rate-of-return-like
mechanism. Price Cap First Report and Order, supra note 67, paras. 186-88.
210. Several carriers had already elected the option of not sharing even prior to its
elimination.
211. See Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers, Petition for Lim-
ited Reconsideration or, in the Alternative, Clarification, CC Docket No. 94-1, at 7 (filed
May 19, 1995) (on file with author); Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange
Carriers, Petition for Expedited Partial Reconsideration of the Ad Hoc Telecommunications
Users Committee, CC Docket 94-1, at 5 (filed May 19, 1995) (on file with author).
212. AT&T has argued that a system of multiple X-Factors coupled with a sharing re-
quirement would be, overall, more efficient economically than a single X-Factor with no
sharing because it would allow LECs to select X-Factors that were closer to those appropri-
ate for their individual circumstances. However, even AT&T acknowledges that, all other
things being equal, sharing reduces a LEC's incentives to become more efficient. See Price
Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers, Comments of AT&T, CC Docket 94-
1, at 36 (filed Jan. 11, 1996) (on file with author).
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•.213
pact in a price cap environment. Eliminating such relics of the rate-of-
return regime would reduce carrier costs and free up regulatory staff to
concentrate on other issues' 4 Finally, sharing was believed necessary to
prevent any gross underestimation of the X-Factor from creating excessive
earnings. Such a buffer is less needed because the FCC is now convinced
that the X-Factor is set at the right level.
215
2. Price Caps Have Led to Substantial Rate Decreases that Have
Benefited Long-Distance Carriers
Access prices for price cap carriers have declined by over 45 percent
during the last eight years, arguably price caps' most significant achieve-
ment.216 Most of these declines can be attributed to the consistent down-
ward pressure of the X-Factor. The rest is due to a mixture of exogenous
cost adjustments and the sharing mechanism. The new 6.5 2gercent X-
Factor is expected to decrease rates by over $1.7 billion a year.
Interexchange carriers have claimed that access charges should have
declined even faster. 21 However, the real deterrent to attaining realistic ac-
cess pricing has been the continued existence of persistent subsidies in
those prices.219 Furthermore, rate-of-return regulation could do no better at
eliminating these subsidies and certainly could not have been expected to
decrease rates faster than did price caps. Therefore, reform of the lingering
subsidies in access pricing and realistic universal service funding mecha-
nisms are the real solution to these IXC concerns.
213. See Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish Competitive Service Safe-
guards for Local Exchange Carrier Provision of Commercial Mobile Radio Services, Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, Order on Remand, and Waiver Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 16,639, paras.
93-126, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 2151 (1996).
214. See Position Paper of Arthur Andersen LLP, Accounting Simplification in the Tele-
communications Industry (exparte), at 11, 17-18 (fied July 15, 1998) (on file with author).
215. See Price Cap Fourth Report and Order, supra note 52, para. 149.
216. INDUSTRY ANALYSIs DIvIsION, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, TRENDS IN
TELEPHONE SERVICE 4 (July 1998).
217. Initial Brief for Local Exchange Carrier Petitioners at 6, United States Tel. Ass'n,
v. FCC, No. 97-1469 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 30, 1998) (on file with author).
218. See, e.g., Price Cap Fourth Report and Order, supra note 52, paras. 71-72.
219. Even the FCC has recognized that it has not yet wrung all subsidies out of access
pricing, even though section 254 of the Communications Act required it to do so. See Ac-
cess Charge Reform First Report and Order, supra note 99, paras. 29-32, aff'd, Southwest-
em Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 1998).
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3. Price Cap Regulation Has Simplified the Documentation that
Must Be Filed with, and Has Streamlined the Evaluation of,
Price Changes
One of the corollary benefits of price cap regulation is that it has sub-
stantially eliminated much of the paperwork associated with rate-of-return
regulation. Because price cap regulation focuses only on the movement of
prices, a detailed showing of costs is no longer necessary. Therefore, the
only support material required is a demonstration of how the price move-
ment is within the appropriate service category band and whether aggre-
gate price changes within a basket are below the price cap index. This has
reduced paperwork for individual rate filings.
Along with the reduced paperwork comes a streamlined review of
such changes. It is obviously easier for the regulator to confirm that price
movements are within band and below cap than to conduct a detailed ex-
amination of cost support materials. This will have even more of an impact
on the state level, where full trial-type hearings have often been conducted
to evaluate rate-of-return showings.
Although there has been a significant upsurge in investigations under
the price cap regime from the rate-of-return regime, this seems to be the
product of two more recent phenomena, rather than as a result of price
caps. First, the Commission has instituted an unprecedented number of
regulatory changes in the access pricing context over the last eight years,
220
much of which surrounds the promotion of competition. Second, the
Commission has become a more aggressive regulator in the last few years
221supported by more sophisticated tools to conduct rate investigations.
These same two factors appeared to be the cause of increased investigative
activity even during the latter half of the 1980s, when rate-of-return regu-
'222lation was still in vogue.
220. See, e.g., Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone Company Facilities,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 5154, 75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1040 (1994);
Transport Rate Structure and Pricing, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 7006, 71 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 567 (1992).
221. The FCC's use of computerized auditing and statistical programs to evaluate carrier
data makes an investigation possible since it can be done without traveling on site and por-
ing through massive carrier records. See, e.g., Common Carrier Bureau Solicits Comments
on Proposed Modifications to ARMIS 43-07 Infrastructure Report, Public Notice, 8
F.C.C.R. 7130, 73 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1017 (1993); 800 Database Access Tariffs and the
800 Service Management System Tariff and Provision of 800 Services, Report and Order,
11 F.C.C.R. 15,227, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1279 (1996).
222. See, e.g., Investigation of Access and Divestiture Related Tariffs, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, CC Docket No. 83-1145, Phase I and Phase I, Part 1, 1986 WL
292562 (1986); Investigation of Special Access Tariffs of Local Exchange Carriers, Memo-
randum Opinion and Order, CC Docket No. 85-166, Phase I, 1986 WL 291617 (1986).
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B. The FCC's Implementation of Price Caps Suffered from
Significant Shortcomings
1. Politicizing Price Caps Has Undermined the Consumer Benefits
that Can Be Achieved
The strength of any economic incentive regulation is that it lends
predictability to the marketplace. Price cap regulators, in their brief eight-
year existence, have seemingly ignored this maxim. Indeed, the FCC has
already revisited the price cap regulatory regime twice in its short his-
tory.M In each of these cases, the agency has not only altered the regula-
tory regime going forward, but has also reached back to "correct" per-
ceived errors or oversights in the previous regime through retroactive
application of the newly revised X-Factor. Yet the core appeal of price cap
regulation is that it provides an incentive for carriers to achieve higher ef-
ficiencies and thus higher profits by exceeding predefined efficiency
goals.224 By making these incentives uncertain, or altogether illusory, the
Commission has undermined one of the core appeals of the price cap sys-
tem.
The most extensive, and most damaging, alterations to the price cap
regime have come in the form of repeated increases and retroactive
changes in the X-Factor. As set out above, the original 1990 price cap in-
dices were set at 3.3 percent (with sharing) and 4.3 percent (without shar-
ing obligations). These indices remained in effect until 1995, when the
Commission issued its Price Cap Performance Review.22 In the review, the
Commission not only scrapped the existing indices, but reached back to
apply those indices to the 1990-1994 period. First, the Commission insti-
tuted a prospective three-level price cap regime with X-Factors of 4.0 per-
cent (with sharing), 4.7 percent (with reduced sharing obligations), and 5.3
226percent (with no sharing). Second, the Commission determined that
those carriers that had selected the 3.3 percent X-Factor for any of the
years 1990 to 1994 would be forced to "reinitialize" their rates for that
223. See Price Cap First Report and Order, supra note 67, para. 199; see also Price Cap
Fourth Report and Order, supra note 52.
224. Indeed, even the Commission, at least publicly, has embraced the notion that indi-
vidual carriers are entitled to excess profits if they achieve exceptional efficiency gains. In
eliminating sharing, the Commission has noted that "[a] firm that is more efficient than its
competitors in a competitive market has the option of not lowering its price and reaping
higher margins on the units it sells at the prevailing market price," and that continuing
"[s]haring would eliminate such an option." Price Cap Fourth Report and Order, supra
note 52, para. 153.
225. See Price Cap First Report and Order, supra note 67.
226. Id. paras. 199-200.
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year as if the carrier had been subject to a 4.0 percent X-Factor all along.2'
The retroactive application of these changes, of course, cannot affect LEC
efficiency because the changes occurred after the fact. These unpredictable
retroactive adjustments dampen efficiency incentives and upset business
planning and expectations. By adjusting the X-Factor, the FCC is also en-
gaged in back door rate-of-return regulation, a result the FCC said it was
trying to avoid.
The 1997 Order furthered this disturbing trend by once again altering
the prospective price cap index-this time by establishing a uniform 6.5
percent X-Factor for all carriers and eliminating the sharing requirement.
The 1997 Order also reinitialized rates for all carriers for 1996 by impos-
ing a 6.5 percent X-Factor, regardless of the carriers' initial X-Factor elec-229
tion. In total, for the first six years of the price cap regime carriers were
able to enjoy the long-term benefits of their regulatory choices for exactly
one year. These shifting regulatory sands meant that higher-than-expected
productivity gains were greeted by regulators with higher X-Factors to
take away these efficiency rewards-the exact rewards that were adver-
tised to greet more efficient carriers as the core of the incentive-driven
price cap regime.
The Commission has similarly disrupted expectations in the regula-
tion of exogenous costs. For example, starting in 1992, companies were
required to shift their accounting procedures to account for post-
employment benefits other than pensions on an accrual basis. Several
companies adjusted their caps accordingly, but the Commission attempted
to disallow the modifications. The D.C. Circuit reversed the Commission
because the existing rules had permitted the adjustment* 2 0 In response, the
Commission promulgated a new rule to preclude recovery of future, amor-
tized installments of other post-employment benefit costs. 23' Here too, the
Commission has altered the rules repeatedly making carriers leery of any
future decisions based on an unreliable regulatory regime.
Even the unscientific way in which the X-Factor has been established
underscores the politicization of the X-Factor. Although some mathemati-
cal formula based on historic efficiency gains could be justified, the FCC
has always adjusted these averages based on its "prediction" about future
gains. For instance, in raising the X-Factor to 6.5 percent, the FCC arbi-
trarily tossed out 1992 from the average because it was "anomalously
227. Id. paras. 245-56.
228. See Price Cap Fourth Report and Order, supra note 52, paras. 157-58.
229. Id. paras. 177-81.
230. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 28 F.3d 165 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
231. See Price Cap First Report and Order, supra note 67, para. 307 & n.578.
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low," without convincing reasoning or evidence for that conclusion. The
FCC failed to throw out anomalously high years and never explained why
averaging results would not adequately correct for the low figures.232 Fail-
ure to straightforwardly deal with these numbers gives credence to the po-
litical manipulation charges. Given that prediction is an art rather than a
science, charges of political manipulation would not be possible if the FCC
had simply used historical trends and been done with it.
2. Price Caps Should Be Structured to Increase the Role of the
Marketplace When Competition Is in Place
There is little question that the Commission needs to quit tampering
with the inner workings of price cap regulation; the agency must also,
however, limit the reach of the overall price cap regime to allow the open
markets it ultimately desires to function properly. Two areas illustrate this
latter concern: inadequate pricing flexibility and inclusion of new services.
Both of these elements have served to delay the transition to an open com-
petitive market. As the Commission itself has observed, "[e]conomic logic
holds that giving incumbent LECs increased pricing flexibility will permit
them to respond to competitive entry, which will allow prices to move in a
way that they would not have moved were the pricing restrictions main-
tained. This can lead to better operating markets and produce more effi-
cient outcomes." Yet, the Commission has thus far failed to grant carri-
ers these market-aiding reforms.
In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking addressing price cap reform,
the Commission seemed to be on the right track in considering regulatory
alternatives that would have given LECs greater flexibility in pricing
services while still reducing the overall price cap.235 More specifically, the
Commission proposed elimination of four regulatory constraints that
would have permitted greater flexibility in pricing upon a showing by the
carrier of potential competition. The proposal included lifting: (1) the pro-
hibition on geographic deaveraging; (2) the ban on volume and term dis-
counts for interstate access services; (3) the prohibition against contract
232. See Price Cap Fourth Report and Order, supra note 52, paras. 138-41.
233. The United States Telephone Association proposed one such unmanipulable aver-
age-a moving five-year average that would change each year based on the previous five-
year average. See id. para. 35.
234. See Access Charge Reform First Report and Order, supra note 99, para. 270
(citation omitted).
235. See Access Charge Reform, Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange
Carriers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Third Report and Order, and Notice of Inquiry,
11 F.C.C.R. 21,354, 5 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 604 (1997) [hereinafter Price Cap NPRM].
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tariffs and individual requests for proposals; and (4) various constraints on
the ability of incumbent LECs to offer new, innovative access services.
236
The Commission also proposed greater flexibility upon a showing
that carriers faced actual competition. These reforms included: (1) elimi-
nation of price cap service categories within baskets; (2) removal of the
ban on differential pricing for access among different classes of customers;
(3) an end to mandatory rate structure rules for transport and local switch-
ing; and (4) consolidation of the traffic-sensitive and trunking baskets.237
These proposals languish without action.
The Commission has still not developed a plan that relies on market-
place forces to drive interstate access prices to levels that would be
achieved through competition. The market-based approach was supposed
to give carriers greater flexibility in setting rates as competition develops.
Notably, however, the agency did not even propose to rely on market
forces to set rates for all access services; those services not currently sub-
ject to competitive pressures will be subject to a regulatory "safeguard" to
bring the related access rates to competitive levels. For those services
subject to competitive pressures, the FCC intends to provide detailed rules
for implementing this market-based approach in the near future. In the
meantime, proposals have surfaced that would take an even more prescrip-
tive approach in light of the perceived competitive shortcomings of the
231
current marketplace.
The Commission's reluctance seems to be contrary to the stated goal
of ultimately moving these services to a fully competitive price struc-
ture.2 '9 For example, geographic deaveraging would permit carriers to set
prices based on smaller geographic units, therefore driving prices closer to
costs. Geographic deaveraging would also correct the false signals that the
current regulated market sends for these services. The current system aver-
ages out costs over large service areas and thus sets rates artificially high
in some areas (thereby creating a perverse incentive for entry) and artifi-
cially low in other areas (thereby creating a perverse incentive against en-
try). Other proposals such as volume and term discounts also seem con-
sistent with cost-based pricing and would spur more competitive pricing
for these services, along with their obvious consumer benefits. Such cost-
based reforms are consistent with the overall Commission policy of driv-
ing prices to costs and creating market-based rates.
236. See id. para. 168.
237. See Price Cap Fourth FNPRM, supra note 81.
238. See id.
239. See supra Part IV.G.
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The Price Cap Notice of Proposed Rulemaking also considered the
possibility of "whether price [cap] regulation of new services is still
needed or warranted."24 The Price Cap Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
further observed that
[m]any new services take advantage of new technical capabilities, and
the delay entailed in obtaining regulatory approval may harm con-
sumer welfare. Because the underlying core access service offerings,
as well as unbundled network elements, would still be available, there
may be little benefit from requiring an incumbent LEC to obtain regu-
latory, approval before introducing a new service.241
The Commission also considered whether some services formerly subject
to the waiver requirement could also be eliminated from price cap regula-
tion "if competing carriers can develop substitute services to respond to
customer needs. 242 Unfortunately, the Commission has deferred a decision
on this issue as well. New services represent another fertile area for the
FCC to roll back regulation because competition can be virtually assumed
and lessened regulation will encourage innovation. Ultimately opening
new service markets and granting increased pricing flexibility will encour-
age a transition to more open markets, innovation, and lower prices for
consumers.
3. The Lack of a Pass-Through Requirement Imposed upon IXCs
Has Undermined End-User Benefits
The long-term goal of price caps is to lower rates for consumers and
this goal has, in part, been achieved. Lower access charges have resulted in
some consumer gains. However, it still appears as if the regulatory scheme
does not "flow through" access charge reductions to consumers unaltered.
Instead, consumers only receive some percentage of the overall reduction.
Indeed by one estimate while access charges fell by an average of 21 per-
cent from 1993 to 1997,243 AT&T's residential basic rates for long-distance244
carriers climbed 18 percent. Moreover, pricing in the long-distance mar-
240. Price Cap NPRM, supra note 234, para. 199. The Commission had previously de-
cided to loosen the tariff requirements on new service offerings. ld. para. 309.
241. Id. para. 199.
242. Id. para. 200.
243. See FCC Monitoring Report, Table 5.12 (May 1997) <http:llwww.fcc.govlBureaus/
CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-StateLinkMonitor/mr97-5.pdf> (John Scott, Competitive
Pricing Division, Federal Communications Commission (preliminary)).
244. See AT&T Proposes $750 Million Rate Hike, New Calling Plan Aimed at High-
Volume Residential Users, TELECOMM. REP., Jan. 3, 1994, at 8 (announcing a 6.3% rate
hike); AT&T and Rivals Boost Rates Further, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 1994, at A3 (3.7% rate
hike); AT&T to Raise Basic Prices an Average 40c a Month, BLOOMBERG NEWS SERVICES,
Feb. 16, 1996 (4.3% rate hike); AT&T Follows MCI, Sprint with Long Distance Rate In-
creases, TELECOMM. REP., Dec. 2, 1996, at 5 (5.9% rate hike); Bill Harvesting II, PNR &
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ket, especially for residential users, is still largely a function of lock-step
pricing among the big three: AT&T, Sprint, and MCI WorldCom.
In 1997, the FCC, not unaware of this phenomenon, secured a deal
with AT&T to flow through access charge reductions to consumers.245
Even this "deal" only flowed through half of the access charge reduc-
tions.246 The Commission has voiced its belief that the market will eventu-
ally force carriers to flow through the benefits of reduced access charges to247
consumers. However, until the long-distance marketplace forces in-
creased flow through of these reductions or the Commission mandates
such flow throughs, the full benefits of price caps will be lost to consum-
ers.
C. The Commission Should Reform Price Caps Consistent with Its
Initial Goals and the Ultimate Destination of Full Competition
The Commission can move in a common sense direction by returning
price caps to first principles to ensure that the incentive-based structure is
preserved and consumers enjoy the benefits of local carrier efficiency
gains. The Commission should:
(1) simplify the X-Factor calculations to maintain their statistical
integrity. This will limit charges of political manipulation and outcome-
based regulation, while assisting all parties in providing relevant comment
and data.
(2) adopt a single X-Factor and maintain it over the long haul to cre-
ate firm incentives for LECs to become more efficient. This will lend pre-
dictability to price cap regulation and increase local carriers' ability to take
advantage of the profit incentives, while allowing long-distance carriers
and consumers to rely on lower fees.
(3) refrain from tinkering with the X-Factor itself or the calculation
formula. Price caps are inherently imprecise. The Commission's constant
tampering to "fix" this problem or that miscalculation has created a larger
problem--complete unpredictability and constant uncertainty.
(4) refrain from making retroactive adjustments in the cap that deny
LECs the benefit of their bargain. The entire regime is based on the ability
to keep profits created by large efficiency gains; the subsequent reclama-
Associates (indicating a 5.8% rate decrease in July 1997, and a 2.7% rate hike in November
1997). Cumulatively, these rate changes amount to an increase of 18% from 1993 to 1997.
245. See Kinnander, supra note 120, at 1. The deal itself has also drawn the ire of some
carriers that believe the reductions in access charges were simply too steep.
246. Id.
247. Price Cap Fourth Report and Order, supra note 52, para. 185.
[Vol. 51
THE PRICE CAP VOYAGE
tion of these gains when doing so cannot alter the carrier's past efficiency,
and undermines the core incentives of the regime.
(5) eliminate the consumer productivity dividend so that the cap re-
flects actual achievable efficiency gains. The CPD may have been neces-
sary in the transition from a rate-of-return regime to price caps. That utility
has now disappeared. An accurate X-Factor makes the CPD an anachro-
nism.
(6) adopt an explicit pass-through requirement that will require long-
distance carriers to pass through price cap reductions to consumers. This
requirement is needed to guarantee that consumers enjoy the benefits of
price cap reductions and eliminates the need for side deals to promote
these policies.
In addition to these changes, the Commission should also use price
caps as a transitional mechanism to the eventual free market. These
changes include:
(1) increased pricing flexibility. As flexibility increases, the price
cap regime moves closer to functioning like a true marketplace. This can
be achieved while still reducing overall rates by the X-Factor. This flexi-
bility could be achieved through such reforms as geographic deaveraging,
permitting volume and term discounts, and the elimination of price cap
service categories within baskets.
(2) placement of new services outside of the caps. The market for
new services is largely competitive. In order to encourage innovation and
transition to the free market, these services should be placed outside the
price cap regime.
These changes can ensure that the promises of the price cap regula-
tion voyage are achieved, while easing and speeding the journey to the
fully competitive marketplace destination to which all parties purportedly
aspire.
VII. CONCLUSION
In replacing rate-of-return regulation with price caps, the FCC
adopted a system with great potential for finally bringing market forces to
local telephone pricing. That initial promise, however, has not fully mate-
rialized due to well-intentioned, but ultimately misguided efforts to tinker
with the price caps' course to competition. Although the price cap voyage
has made substantial progress, the Commission would be well-served to
return to its initial course in order to reach the destination of competition
as soon as possible. Until the obstacles to market forces disappear, con-
sumers will not experience the true benefits of the price cap system.
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